{"id":3945,"date":"2014-05-07T20:32:16","date_gmt":"2014-05-07T20:32:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/?p=3945"},"modified":"2014-05-08T15:48:06","modified_gmt":"2014-05-08T15:48:06","slug":"the-most-simple-criticism-of-the-kalam-cosmological-argument","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/2014\/05\/07\/the-most-simple-criticism-of-the-kalam-cosmological-argument\/","title":{"rendered":"The most simple criticism of the Kalam Cosmological Argument"},"content":{"rendered":"

Listening to the Reasonable Doubts criticism<\/a>\u00a0of the dreadful sounding film\u00a0God’s Not Dead<\/em>, Justin Schieber referred to a point made by Wes Morriston.<\/p>\n

The notion that a house popped into existence out of nothing is no more bizarre than a person built the house out of nothing.<\/p>\n

As Ex-Apologist states<\/a>:<\/p>\n

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hus, suppose we came upon a log cabin in the forest, and were told that the cabin was very special: it popped into existence out of nothing without an efficient cause. I imagine most of us would find that implausible. But suppose instead that we were told that it was special for another reason: a lumberjack built it without building materials. I imagine most of us would find the second claim at least as implausible as the first claim.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Theists claim that God is able to do the ‘impossible’ – create something out of nothing. But that is just moving the intuitively problematic claim of ex nihilo nihil fit sideways.<\/p>\n

As Morriston himself says<\/a>:<\/p>\n

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After all, a house “popping into existence out of nowhere” doesn\u2019t seem any less absurd just because somebody says (or thinks), “Let there be a house where there was no house.”<\/p>\n

To say that this is unproblematic when the “somebody” in question is an omnipotent God is to beg the question against those who doubt that creation\u00a0ex nihilo\u00a0<\/i>is metaphysically possible. The reason is that on standard assumptions about the nature of omnipotence, God is not supposed to be able to do what is\u00a0metaphysically\u00a0<\/i>impossible. If someone insists it is just “obvious” that God could create a world without any preexisting material stuff to work with, on the ground that there is no\u00a0lo gical<\/i>\u00a0contradiction in the idea of such a feat, then the proper reply is that there is\u00a0also\u00a0<\/i>no\u00a0logical<\/i>\u00a0contradiction in the idea of the universe beginning without a cause.<\/p>\n

This point can be expressed quite precisely in terms of Aristotle\u2019s distinction between efficient and material causes. When I do the relevant “thought experiments,” I find the absence of amaterial\u00a0<\/i>cause at least as troubling as the absence of a n\u00a0efficient\u00a0<\/i>cause. At the level of raw, untutored, intuition, the idea of somebody “making” a universe out of absolutely nothing seems to me to be every bit as absurd as that of a “beginning” with no efficient cause.<\/p>\n

I am not suggesting that creation\u00a0ex nihilo\u00a0<\/i>is logically or metaphysically impossible. I am also well aware that the\u00a0kalam\u00a0<\/i>argument is not an argument for a first\u00a0material\u00a0<\/i>cause, but rather an argument for a first\u00a0efficient\u00a0<\/i>cause. (Notwithstanding the title of one of Craig\u2019s articles on the\u00a0kalam<\/i>\u00a0argument!) Nevertheless, I think the “intuitive” absurdity of making something “out of” nothing is a near neighbor of the intuition that something can\u2019t “come from” nothing, and this raises a doubt about the wisdom of relying so heavily on such “intuitions” for the defense of premise (1). Craig may perhaps not unreasonably be accused of emphasizing intuitions that support the picture of creation he wishes to defend, and neglecting those that don\u2019t.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Addendum:<\/p>\n

Here is William Lane Craig’s response<\/a>, and here is Morriston’s counter<\/a>.<\/p>\n

RELATED POSTS:<\/p>\n