Tom Clark, or the Center For Naturalism, and someone whom I will shortly be interviewing, has created this transcript of the excellent talk given by Sam Harris at the Dangerous Ideas event in Sydney recently. Tom has kindly allowed me to repost it here. It might not be exact, but it serves as a useful resource. I will also embed the video. Multidimensional learning!<\/p>\n
http:\/\/youtu.be\/_FanhvXO9Pk<\/p>\n
Sam Harris on the delusion of free will at the Dangerous Ideas festival in Sydney<\/p>\n
http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=_FanhvXO9Pk<\/a><\/p>\n Sept 28, 2012 at the Sydney Opera House<\/p>\n Moderator asks: Will a culture war break out, as Sam predicts it might, if we take on the question of free will?<\/p>\n Sam\u2019s remarks:<\/p>\n Most sensitive topic he\u2019s had the honor to touch<\/p>\n Without free will religion doesn\u2019t make sense<\/p>\n FW touches everything we care about, that makes us human, e.g., guilt and response, depends on us being the conscious source of our thoughts and actions<\/p>\n Want to convince you FW is an illusion and that it matters<\/p>\n Two misunderstandings:<\/p>\n 1) We don\u2019t understand enough yet to reach the conclusion that popular notion of free will is an illusion. Not true, since FW is completely incoherent. [Note he hasn\u2019t defined it yet, the popular notion of FW]<\/p>\n 2) Of course commonsense FW doesn\u2019t fit the facts, is an illusion but that\u2019s just academic, nothing important changes when we deny it. Also untrue on my view.<\/p>\n Crocodile vs. human in doing one harm, difference in reactive attitude, feelings of revenge, etc. for human but not for croc.\u00a0 The idea of FW accounts for the difference. Croc was just being a croc, but the human had free will and could have done otherwise (CHDO) and should have done otherwise (SHDO).<\/p>\n Most folks think morality has to be grounded in FW, and necessary for getting what we want out of life. But not so. We can get what we want out of life without suffering any illusion about human behavior.<\/p>\n Popular conception of free will rests on two assumptions:<\/p>\n 1) Each of us was free to act differently than we did in the past. You chose A but you could have chosen B. That\u2019s how it seems to most of us.<\/p>\n 2) You are the conscious source of thoughts and actions. Conscious part of you is actually the author of your inner life and behavior.<\/p>\n These are false: we live in a world of cause and effect. Either you\u2019re a product of chain of cause and effect, or you\u2019re a product of randomness. In neither case are you responsible. Or it\u2019s some combination. Free will makes no sense no matter what the combination.<\/p>\n To say someone has free will must mean he could have consciously done otherwise, not based on random influences but because he was conscious author and could have thought and acted in other ways. But no good account of how this could be given chain of cause and effect, e.g., environmental, genetic and situational factors of a murderer. When we see chain of causes that precede a conscious experience and that reach back into childhood or out into the world, then the sense of culpability disappears, the place where we place our blame disappears. [TC: well, we can blame the whole chain, including the agent, in terms of targeting interventions. But we don\u2019t any longer single out the agent as ultimately responsible in the way we used to.] To say he CHDO would be to say he was in a different universe or been a different person. As disturbing as I find that person\u2019s behavior, have to admit that if I traded places with him atom for atom I would be him, and would behave exactly as he did and for the same reasons. There\u2019s no extra part of me that could have resisted the impulse to victimize innocent people.<\/p>\n Even if I have an immortal soul, I cannot take credit for the fact that I don\u2019t have the soul of a psychopath [right, we don\u2019t choose our souls]<\/p>\n \u201cThe role of luck in our lives appears decisive.\u201d\u00a0 17:15\u00a0 The moral significance of luck seems difficult to admit, it seems to destabilize us, we seem not to know how to think about evil in this context. But when in specific cases we see the cause of evil our moral intuitions shift utterly, e.g., brain tumor. Brain tumor is just a special case. \u201cIf we fully understood the physiology of a murder\u2019s brain it would be just as exculpatory as finding a tumor in it.\u201d\u00a0 18:20<\/p>\n \u201cIf we could see how the wrong genes were being relentlessly transcribed, if we could see how his early life experience had sculpted the microstructure of his brain in just such as way as to give rise to violent impulses, the whole conception of placing blame on him would erode.\u201d [Exact quote, ending at 18:45] [Right, in that we put the agent completely in context and see the causal role of non-agent factors]<\/p>\n 18:45 Philosophers have put forward a [compatibilist] notion of free will that can withstand the facts.<\/p>\n The problem of free will is deeper than cause and effect. Most people suppose we have the experience of free will and we can\u2019t map that experience onto reality. But free will doesn\u2019t even correspond to a subjective fact about ourselves and if you pay close attention you can see this: our thoughts simply appear in consciousness. [TC: yes, we don\u2019t see them caused, so we suppose they are uncaused<\/em>, same with decisions. This supports the idea that we cause without being caused in turn.]<\/p>\n 21:15\u00a0 Thoughts just emerge, we\u2019re not authoring them.\u00a0 [TC: we are if we are our unconscious as well as conscious processes] We can\u2019t choose them before we think them; that would require we think them before we think them. \u201cIf you can\u2019t control your next thought and you don\u2019t know what it will be until it appears, where is your freedom of will?\u201d 21:30\u00a0 You don\u2019t choose your thoughts.\u00a0 If you understand what I\u2019m saying you didn\u2019t create that either. {TC: so its\u2019 the conscious self that Sam is identifying that doesn\u2019t have free will]\u00a0 Everything is just happening, and that includes your thoughts and desires and your most deliberate efforts. 22:20<\/p>\n The present moment is already a memory that is being buffered. The unconscious machinery produces thoughts, intentions, and actions and this is where the notion of free will and moral responsibility begin to get squeezed.\u00a0 Libet experiments. Time lag between when you think you\u2019ve decided to do something and the moment at which your brain decided. 24:30\u00a0 [TC: Sam\u2019s residual dualism of the conscious you vs. your unconscious brain<\/span>]<\/p>\n \u201cThe experience of deciding during this period where you feel that you are free to do anything you want has already been determined by the state of your brain.\u201d 25:50\u00a0 Hard to reconcile with free will since in principle it would allow someone to predict what you\u2019re going to do while you think you\u2019re still making up your mind. But even if the conscious intention were truly simultaneous with the neurophysiological underpinnings, there would still be no room for free will because you still wouldn\u2019t know why it is you do what you do in that moment.\u00a0 [TC: often we do<\/em> know. Harris is talking about moment-to-moment spontaneity, not deliberative action.]<\/p>\n Example of mentally picking a movie. No evidence of free will in this. Were you free to choose whatever it is that did not occur to you to choose? You don\u2019t know why you chose Avatar over Lawrence of Arabia. Free will is going back and forth between two options and not suffering any constraints from external world. But it\u2019s a mystery of why you chose it. You can tell a story but it\u2019s usually wrong. [TC: overstates this.] You, the conscious witness of your inner life isn\u2019t making these decisions. All you can do is witness them. [Dualism of witnessing self vs. producing brain]<\/p>\n Our experience in life is totally compatible with determinism. We don\u2019t have this robust sense of free will the moment we actually pay attention to how thoughts and intentions arise. This is true whether or not we have immortal souls. The case against [contra-causal] free will doesn\u2019t presuppose materialism.\u00a0 The unconscious operation of the soul grants you no more free will than that of your brain. If you don\u2019t know what your soul is going to do next you\u2019re not in control of your soul. 32:40 [On Harris\u2019s view, control means knowing in advance what you want to achieve, not the spontaneous behavior control of the brain and body.]<\/p>\n The endurance of the problem of free will is due to the experience that we freely author our thoughts and actions [TC: note that this contradicts his assertion that we don\u2019t actually have this experience] The only philosophically respectable defense of free will is compatibilism \u2013 compatible with determinism. Dennett a compatibilist: if murderer kills acts in accordance with desires and intentions that\u2019s all the free will you need. But from a moral and scientific point of view this seems to miss the point. Where is the freedom in doing what one wants when one\u2019s desires are the product of prior events that one is completely unaware of and have no hand in creating? Compatibilism is like saying a puppet<\/span> is free if it loves its strings. [Sam\u2019s puppet error] 34:50\u00a0 Compatibilists push back and say that you are the totality of what goes on inside your brain and body, so your unconscious mental life and physiology is just as much you as your conscious inner life is. But\u00a0 this seems like a bait and switch. It trades a psychological fact, this experience we have of consciously authoring our thoughts and actions for a general conception of ourselves as persons.\u00a0 It\u2019s a little like saying you\u2019re made of stardust, which you are, but you don\u2019t feel like stardust. And the knowledge that you\u2019re stardust is not driving your moral intuitions and influencing our system of criminal justice.\u00a0 Most people identify with a certain channel of information in their conscious minds. They feel that they are in control, that they are the source. And this is an illusion. [TC: but it isn\u2019t<\/em> an illusion that we are our brains] 36:21\u00a0 The you that you take yourself to be at this present moment isn\u2019t in control<\/span> of anything. [TC: but we are<\/span> our brains and body, and in control of our behavior, and we aren\u2019t puppets.]\u00a0 Compatibilist try to save free will by saying you are more than this, that you are the totality of what goes on in your brain and body. But you don\u2019t feel responsible for this. Are you making red blood cells right now?\u00a0 If your body were to stop making them you wouldn\u2019t be responsible for this, you\u2019d be the victim<\/em> of this change. So to say that you are responsible or identical to everything that goes on inside your brain and body is to make a claim about you that bears absolutely no relationship to the experience of conscious authorship and subjectivity that has made free will that has made free will a problem for philosophy in the first place. [TC: The experience is non-veridical, we agree. But that doesn\u2019t make us puppets or undercut behavior control.]<\/p>\n What does this all mean?\u00a0 To argue for determinism is not to argue for fatalism<\/span> [good] 37:53\u00a0 To sit back and see what happens is itself a choice which has its own consequences. Also very hard to do. The fact that our decisions and efforts depend on prior causes doesn\u2019t mean they aren\u2019t important. [good]\u00a0 Effort and discipline and attention all matter, goals. These are all causal states of the brain that lead to behaviors and outcomes in the world. So in a way not that much changes. The choices we make in life are as important as fanciers of free will imagine. So fatalism is untrue. 39:30S\u00a0 The idea that the future is going to be what its going to be regardless of what you think and do, that is clearly untrue. But the next thing you think and do is going to come out of a wilderness of prior causes which you \u2013 the conscious witness of your inner life \u2013 cannot see and did not bring into being.\u00a0 You have not built your mind. [TC: Harris has two basic points against contra-causal free will:\u00a0 no causa sui<\/em>, no conscious controller. ] When it seems like you build it the only tools at your disposal are those you\u2019ve inherited from moments past.\u00a0 No one picks their parents, their moment of history or how their nervous system gets shaped\u2026 you are no more responsible for the structure of your brain as well as its functional states as you are for your height.<\/p>\n But I\u2019m not saying that you can just blame your parents for every bad thing that happened to you and make no effort to change yourself. [good] This is a way of misunderstanding the argument. It is possible to change. In fact viewing yourself as a system open to myriad influences actual makes change seem more possible. [good] 41:00\u00a0 You aren\u2019t condemned to be the person you were yesterday, in fact you can\u2019t be that person. The self is not a stable entity, it is a process. But it is a fundamentally mysterious process [TC: not so, we have lots of accurate self-knowledge, and getting more every day. Just because we aren\u2019t privy to our unconscious operations doesn\u2019t obviate useful self-knowledge.]\u00a0 None of us know how we arrived at this moment of our lives. [often we do have a pretty accurate story, in hindsight] There is a mystery here in the present moment that doesn\u2019t get eradicated even though you have a story to tell about why you think you did something.\u00a0 We are at each moment simply discovering what our life is. This may sound scary, but it actually can be quite freeing to view the world this way.<\/p>\n So our choices matter and there are paths toward making wiser ones and there\u2019s no telling how much a good conversation could change you or how it might matter to surround yourself with smart people or get an education, but you don\u2019t choose to choose what you choose in life, there\u2019s a regress that always ends in darkness.\u00a0 You always take a first step, or a last one, for reasons that are bound to remain inscrutable [TC: not sure why he thinks this]\u00a0 And to declare your freedom in this context is really just a way of saying I don\u2019t know why I did that but I didn\u2019t mind doing it and I\u2019d be willing to do it again. 42:48<\/p>\n Just think of the context of your next decision. You didn\u2019t pick any of the influences that shaped your neurophysiology, you didn\u2019t pick your soul if you have one. And yet this totality of influences and states [TC: that is, you<\/em>] will be the thing that produces your next decision. 44:00 Yes, you\u2019re free to do whatever you want but where do your desires come from?\u00a0 [Harris tends to conflate\/elide\/combine the no causa sui point with the point about the causal role of the conscious controller.]<\/p>\n 44:10\u00a0 It seems that this talk is beginning to undermine a sense of moral order, and in fact this is the position of the US Supreme Court. It said that free will is a universal and persistent assumption of our criminal justice system, that\u2019s a quote and determinism is incompatible with the underlying precepts of our approach to justice. So the idea [of FW] is actually doing work in our world. The problem is that if we view people as neuronal weather patterns it seems to undermine the basis for placing blame. But I think this is a false assumption. I think we can have a very strong sense of morality and an effective criminal justice system without lying to ourselves about the causes of human behavior. [good]45:00<\/p>\n What do we most condemn in people morally and legally?\u00a0 It\u2019s the conscious intention to do harm. Why is this so blameworthy?\u00a0 Consciousness is the context in which all the qualities of our minds seem activated. It\u2019s where our beliefs and desires and prejudices rub up against one another. What you do consciously tends to say the most about you and what you\u2019re likely to do in the future.\u00a0 The point is not that you are the sole independent cause of your behavior, the point is that you have the mind of a murderer [after deliberating for 2 weeks to kill your neighbor].\u00a0 You\u2019re not ultimately responsible that you have that mind, but yet you do have it, and it must be taken seriously.\u00a0 Some criminals have to be locked up and the moral justification is very straightforward: everyone is better off that way. That still makes sense without free will, but what doesn\u2019t make sense is the motive of retribution, the motive of punishing someone because they deserve it<\/span>.\u00a0 48:00 We don\u2019t punish crocodiles because they deserve it, actually that hasn\u2019t always been true. Lynching of an elephant in TN in 1916! [TC: shows that norms about desert have evolved, a matter of culture, understanding causes, mental states, etc.] It may be that certain crimes require punishment in order to be deterred, but this is a pragmatic argument, nothing to do with retribution. [good]<\/p>\n 49:30 Dispensing with free will allows us to focus on things that actually matter, like mitigating harm, deterring crime, assessing risk. [good] So I\u2019m not arguing that everyone\u2019s not guilty by reason of insanity. The bad people need to be locked up if that\u2019s all we can do to keep ourselves safe. [TC: but of course prevention, first chances, more economic equity and opportunity are better approaches to ensuring public safety] And all the distinctions we care about, e.g., between voluntary and involuntary action, moral responsibilities of an adult vs. a child, all of those notions can be conserved without this notion of free will. [good]<\/p>\n 50:00 In the US we have 13 year olds serving life sentences for crimes..not based on any sane assessment of whether these children can be rehabilitated, it\u2019s based on the sense that they deserve this punishment, they are the true, sole cause of their behavior which was so heinous that they deserve this as a matter of retribution.\u00a0 That doesn\u2019t\u2019 make sense when you relax this notion of free will. You have to admit in the final analysis is that even the most terrifying people are at bottom unlucky to be who they are<\/span>, and that\u00a0 has moral significance. And the existence of the soul wouldn\u2019t make any difference: anyone born with the soul of a psychopath is profoundly unlucky.\u00a0 Walk back the timeline of Udai Hussein\u2019s life, he became a psychopath through no fault of his own. If we could have intervened at any point in his life to prevent this, that would have been the right thing to do, and compassion<\/span> would have been the motive.\u00a0 If you want not to hate your enemies, like Jesus said, one way into that is to view human behavior through the lens of a wider scientific picture of causation.<\/p>\n 53:20\u00a0 I\u2019m not saying it would be easy to adopt this perspective if you or someone close to you was victim of a violent crime; this is how we need to see the world in our more dispassionate moments.\u00a0 But these moments are the source of our thinking about public policy and scientific truth.\u00a0 To see how much our moral intuitions would shift, imagine we had a cure for evil and psychopathy. We can make the necessary changes in the brain safely and painlessly and easily. At that point evil is a nutritional deficiency. Imagine the moral logic of withholding the cure for evil from someone as a punishment for their evil acts. He was so bad he shouldn\u2019t be given the cure.\u00a0 Does that make any sense at all?\u00a0 55:00 That it doesn\u2019t reveals that the urge for retribution is actually born of not seeing the causes of human behavior. When you see them, if you could trace them in a fine-grained way,\u00a0 this notion of vengeance, that people deserve what they get in this way as punishment would disappear<\/span>. [TC: note that some compatibilists vigorously defend retribution, such as Morse<\/a> and Moore<\/a>. ]<\/p>\n 55:30\u00a0 Leads me to religion, since of course the notion of God\u2019s justice is entirely a matter of retribution. People deserve what they get since based on their own free will they are misbehaving. The religious answer to the problem of evil is free will [theodicy]. Free will creates sin: people as the sole cause of their behavior can turn away from god. But this can\u2019t be true, and it seems impossible to describe a universe in which it could be true. There\u2019s no mix of randomness and determinism that gets you [contra-causal] free will.<\/p>\n Ironically one of the fears that religious people have is that this way of viewing the world dehumanizes us, but rather I think it humanizes us<\/span>. [good] What could be more dehumanizing than to say that most people throughout human history are in some crucial way responsible for the fact that they were born at the wrong time to the wrong parents, given the wrong beliefs, given the wrong religion, wrong influences and as a result of that the deserve to be punished for eternity? [TC: yes this is the central point: why do fully determined agents deserve to suffer for no consequentialist reason?]<\/p>\n 58:30 The illusion of free will is itself an illusion. There is no illusion of free will. Thoughts and intentions simply arise, what else could they do?\u00a0 This may sound depressing but it\u2019s actually incredibly freeing to see life this way. It does take something away from life: it takes away an egocentric view of life<\/span>.\u00a0 We are not truly separate, we are linked to one another, we are linked to the world, we are linked to our past and to history [TC: connection<\/span>]\u00a0 And what we do actually matters because of that linkage, because of the permeability, because of the fact that we can\u2019t be the true locus of responsibility [good \u2013 he means sole,<\/em> ultimate<\/em> locus]. That\u2019s what makes it all matter.\u00a0 You can\u2019t take credit for your talents, but it really matters if you use them. [nice] 59:50\u00a0 You can\u2019t really be blamed for your weaknesses and your failings, but it matters if you correct them.\u00a0 Pride and shame don\u2019t make a lot of sense in the final analysis, but they were no fun anyway, these are isolating emotions.\u00a0 What does make sense is things like compassion<\/span> and love. Caring about well being makes sense, trying to maximize it makes sense. All of this still makes sense without free will.\u00a0 And nothing that I\u2019ve said makes social and political freedom any less valuable. [good] The freedom to do what one want\u2019s is still precious.\u00a0 But the idea that we as conscious beings are deeply responsible for what we want needs to be revised.\u00a0 [good] It just can\u2019t be mapped onto reality, neither objective nor subjective.\u00a0 And if we\u2019re going to be guided by reality, instead of the fantasy lives of our ancestors, our view of ourselves has to change. [yes!]<\/p>\n 1:03:00\u00a0 Question: How close do you think we are to a universal declaration of the illusory nature of free will?<\/p>\n Sam: The current state of affairs is that most people just don\u2019t want to think about it. Most people\u2019s intuitions are powerfully shaped by the illusion the sense that they have the freedom to consciously author their thoughts and actions, so people feel that there\u2019s a compelling subjective mystery, and no one has been able to give an argument about how it would map onto physical reality. But the experience is so compelling that people feel there\u2019s no reason to worry about it. Then there are people like Dan Dennett who essentially change the subject.\u00a0 I want to say free will doesn\u2019t exist<\/span>. Dan wants to say that free will exists but it is really something else. He\u2019s responded to me by saying that I\u2019m saying free will in this redefined [compatibilist] sense doesn\u2019t exist. So there\u2019s a fair amount of talking past one another.<\/p>\n Answer to a rather confused question:\u00a0 epiphenomenalism re consciousness not implied by my argument against free will because it could be that certain things have to be promoted to consciousness in order to have the effects they have [TC: but still phenomenal consciousness per se isn\u2019t adding anything to what the brain does, it\u2019s the neurally instantiated processes associated<\/em> with consciousness that do the work from a 3rd<\/sup> person perspective.] It\u2019s just that their promotion isn\u2019t something that we as conscious witnesses ever engineer.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 I can\u2019t unconsciously<\/em> decide that this pain in my hip warrants a trip to a doctor.\u00a0 Something has to arise into consciousness and begin a cascade of other effects. Consciousness could be the difference that makes a difference and it is in many cases, but its still a mystery as to why that particular thought patter arose in that moment.\u00a0 In the present moment it\u2019s always true to say you don\u2019t know what\u2019s coming next as a matter of consciousness. And the larger picture is that you didn\u2019t make yourself who you are. So you can\u2019t truly own it, so the role of luck and its moral significance is something we have to talk about.<\/p>\n Question about real world effects of no free will in his life:\u00a0 the emotion and ethical component is important in my life.\u00a0 I don\u2019t always see the world this way, I have to remind myself to see it this way, and when I do it completely undercuts the basis for hatred. No rationale for hating the person.\u00a0 In a situation where I\u2019m liable to take their hostility personally, see them as the source that inspires anger and hatred, but viewing with the wider lens about how we both got into that situation makes the bottom drops out and the logic of indulging that mood falls away. And that seems to me an intrinsically good thing.\u00a0 Can you still love people view them this way (a worry for some people)?\u00a0 I find that there is no sacrifice to the good stuff.\u00a0 To think in those terms doesn\u2019t cancel desire for my daughter\u2019s happiness.\u00a0 The love survives the truth.<\/p>\n In response to next question about wife not deciding<\/em> to love him: stripping off the illusion does have certain costs, you lose certain kinds of pleasures, you can\u2019t take them as seriously as you otherwise would. When you lose Santa Claus you actually lose something, but it has too many costs. 1:21<\/p>\n On the whole the change [in giving up the free will illusion] is almost entirely positive. All the negative states of mind that motivate people to waste their entire lives are anchored to this illusion. The moment I begin to take it personally there\u2019s nothing good about it. The ability to disengage from that and see the illusion of that does come at the cost that you can\u2019t indulge the good stuff at the same level you otherwise would, and pride and hatred are on a similar level: how proud can I be? When I do something really well and look closely at that moment I can\u2019t really make much out of it [take credit\/blame]. So I can\u2019t be so motivated by that turn of events [by credit\/blame]. I see how much luck was involved and other people\u2019s contributions and stuff I wasn\u2019t aware of. You can wake up from the dream of [self-credit and self-blame] but you still want to do things it\u2019s just your less miserable.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Tom Clark, or the Center For Naturalism, and someone whom I will shortly be interviewing, has created this transcript of…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[52,58,102],"class_list":["post-2244","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-free-will-and-determinism","tag-determinism","tag-free-will","tag-sam-harris"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2244","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2244"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2244\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2244"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2244"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2244"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}