{"id":1179,"date":"2012-11-30T12:00:56","date_gmt":"2012-11-30T12:00:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/?p=1179"},"modified":"2012-11-30T13:06:08","modified_gmt":"2012-11-30T13:06:08","slug":"does-morality-depend-on-god","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/2012\/11\/30\/does-morality-depend-on-god\/","title":{"rendered":"Does Morality Depend on God?"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is one of my favourite essays on the subject of morality and God. It is by P. Wesley Edwards and can be found variously online, such as here<\/a>. JohnM was espousing the idea in his comments here that under an atheistic worldview, there is no moral foundation. Moreover, as the argument goes, only God can provide a sound underpinning for morality. In this essay, Edwards shows how this tack is circular and thus incoherent. As ever, let me know what you think.<\/p>\n

<\/h3>\n

Does Morality Depend on God?<\/h2>\n
\n
December 30, 2011<\/div>\n

By\u00a0P. Wesley Edwards<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Introduction<\/h3>\n

I have rarely engaged in a debate with a theist where the issue of morality justification has not come up.\u00a0 The theist\u2019s complaint typically takes the following form.<\/p>\n

\n

If there is no God, then why is it wrong to murder and\u00a0 steal? Even if you don\u2019t want to murder and steal, on what grounds can you criticize someone who does, since morals must be completely relative and arbitrary to an atheist?\u00a0 Without God there is no criterion for deciding what is good and evil beyond the whim of the individual. In other words, without God there is\u00a0no way to answer the question, \u201cWhy is x wrong?\u201d\u00a0 As a believer in the one true God, I know why, and I know why in absolute terms.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Of course, most thoughtful theists recognize that non-theistic ethical systems can and do exist, and that in fact most atheists hold moral values not entirely unlike their own.\u00a0 Indeed, most ethical systems the world over, and throughout history, share a considerable core set of values on issues relating, for example, to minimizing the suffering of innocents, and putting the needs of family, friends, and community ahead of one\u2019s own selfish interests.\u00a0 So, the debate here is not so much about whose particular\u00a0body<\/em>\u00a0of moral codes is the right one. Rather, the debate centers on meta-ethics; that is, the means by which people\u00a0justify<\/em>\u00a0their choice of an ethical system.\u00a0 The theist can accept that an atheist might believe that murder is morally wrong based on one or another atheistic ethical system.\u00a0 The theist\u2019s complaint, however, is that the atheist\u2019s ethical system is completely arbitrary; that the atheist cannot justify using his ethical code beyond saying, \u201cJust because I want to.\u201d<\/p>\n

So it is this meta-ethical angst that is behind the theist\u2019s heart-felt question, \u201cWhy is\u00a0anything<\/em>wrong if there is no God?\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 Alarmingly, more than a few ask this out of a genuine view that without the fear of punishment and the promise of reward there is no reason to be good.\u00a0 They hold a crude kind of when-the-cat\u2019s-away-the-mice-will-play outlook that equates \u201cgood\u201d to that which is rewarded, and \u201cbad\u201d to that which is punished.\u00a0 For these folks, without someone holding carrots and sticks, there is no reason to be good; no way to know what\u00a0is<\/em>\u00a0good. Thankfully, most thoughtful theists recognize the inherent amorality of such a simplistic approach; instead, they go to great lengths to explain not only that God is perfectly good, but that He forms the necessary \u201cground\u201d of goodness, and that therefore morality really does depend on Him.\u00a0 (That being said, it is surprising how often otherwise thoughtful theists will appeal to brute power when challenged to morally justify some Old Testament God-ordered atrocity, such as when they argue that since God made us, He can do as He pleases\u2014just as a potter can do as he pleases with his clay pots.)<\/p>\n

The thesis of this article is not only that morality does not depend on God, but that any ethical or meta-ethical theory based on such a claim necessarily commits several fatal errors: first, it necessarily commits one to an arbitrary and indefensible definition of right and wrong (which is ironic given the theist\u2019s charge that it is non-theistic ethics that is necessarily arbitrary); second, it makes any definition of \u201cgood\u201d vacuously, and\u2014as a guide for human behavior\u2014dangerously tautological; and third, such a meta-ethical view necessarily leads to ethical systems that value unthinking obedience to rules above all else.<\/p>\n

The Problem of Circularity<\/h3>\n

The hidden assumption in the theist challenge is that, unlike the atheist, the theist can coherently answer the question, \u201cWhy is x good?\u201d\u00a0 A common debating error is to let this go unchallenged, while moving directly to a defense of an atheistic meta-ethics.\u00a0 Generally, the theist\u2019s answer to the Why question is because it is God\u2019s will. To this a fair response is, \u201cWhy follow God\u2019s will?\u201d Now to this the theist\u2019s response can be either the avoid-punishment\/gain-reward answer or \u201cBecause God\u2019s will is good.\u201d\u00a0 We\u2019ve already eliminated the first part, so let\u2019s look at the second part: \u201cBecause God\u2019s will is good.\u201d<\/p>\n

Now for the statement, \u201cGod is good,\u201d or more generally, \u201cX is good,\u201d to even make sense, we need some idea of what \u201cgood\u201d means.\u00a0 For example, if I say, \u201cFred is perfectly zugblub,\u201d then you have no idea what I mean unless you have some idea of what \u201czugblub\u201d means.\u00a0 Suppose after pointing this out to me, I respond, \u201cFred is the very standard by which zugblub is defined; Zugblub is part of the very essence of Fred.\u00a0 Indeed, Fred actually forms the necessary ground of all zugblub.\u00a0\u00a0That<\/em>\u00a0is what zugblub\u00a0means<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

This so-called definition of zugblub communicates no information.\u00a0\u00a0 The problem is that I have not defined zuglub\u00a0independently<\/em>\u00a0of Fred.\u00a0 All my definition amounts to is different ways of saying \u201cFred is Fred\u201d and \u201czugblub is zugblub.\u201d\u00a0 These are true statements to be sure, but not particularly informative ones.\u00a0 In other words, my definition of zugblub is tautological\u2014an empty truth.<\/p>\n

For example, one critic of my original article succinctly captured this phenomenon when he said, \u201cGod says it is good because it\u00a0is<\/em>\u00a0good.\u00a0How<\/em>\u00a0do we know that it is good? Because God\u2019s very nature is good. God\u00a0is\u00a0<\/em>the standard.\u201d\u00a01<\/sup><\/p>\n

This is a straightforward tautology:<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0 What God says is good.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0 God is the standard by which good is defined.<\/p>\n

By (2) \u201cgood\u201d means that which God is, which includes all that He says, does, and wills. \u00a0By substitution (1) becomes \u201cWhat God says is what God says.\u201d<\/p>\n

Now, it seems clear that theists don\u2019t actually intend the statement, \u201cGod is good\u201d to be a statement of identity.\u00a0 In other words, \u201cgood\u201d forms part, but not all, of the definition of God. \u00a0To use Kai Nielsen\u2019s example, theists say \u201cGod is good\u201d in the way that people would say \u201cPuppies are young.\u201d\u00a0 You can see this by examining everyday statements such as \u201cIt is good that you gave money to that charity.\u201d\u00a0 This is certainly not equivalent to saying \u201c It is God that you gave money to that charity.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 Though, to the theist, it might be equivalent to saying, \u201cIt is consistent with one of God\u2019s characteristics that you gave to that charity.\u201d<\/p>\n

So we can see that tautologies are not limited to statements of identity.\u00a0 A statement like \u201cPuppies are young,\u201d or \u201cBachelors are unmarried,\u201d is sometimes called an analytic statement, which means that its predicate forms part of the definition of its subject.\u00a0 Such statements are tautological in that they are true by definition.\u00a0 Identity statements communicate no information beyond stating a rule of\u00a0logic<\/em>.\u00a0 Analytic statements communicate no information beyond stating a rule of\u00a0language<\/em>. But analytic statements can\u2019t even do that unless we understand their predicates (e.g., \u201cyoung\u201d)\u00a0independently<\/em>\u00a0of their subjects (e.g., \u201cpuppies\u201d).\u00a0 As Nielsen puts it,<\/p>\n

If we had no understanding of the word \u201cyoung\u201d and if we did not know the criteria for deciding whether a dog was young, we could not know how correctly to apply the word \u201cpuppy.\u201d\u00a0 Without such a prior understanding of what it is to be young we could not understand the sentence, \u201cPuppies are young.\u201d\u00a02<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Another theist critic rather eloquently illustrated this kind of tautological reasoning as follows,<\/p>\n

Goodness is not defined simply because God wills it, nor is goodness determined by a standard existing outside of God. Obedience should be seen as part of the essence of mankind \u2013 as we were created by the Creator, in His image, we have at our core the essence of His character. That is, as God is the definition of goodness and holiness, not only our self-awareness but also our standard for what is good, what is moral, flows from the immutable character of God. As God is the very essence of goodness \u2013 His character -nothing will be willed by Him in contradiction of His nature . . . Further, the concepts of human and divine morality, or goodness, are not independent things. Our recognition of goodness comes directly from the fact of our creation in His image.\u00a03<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Let\u2019s break this down so the tautology is more apparent:<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0 \u201cGoodness is not defined because God wills it.\u201d<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0 \u201cGod is the definition of goodness and holiness.\u201d<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0 \u201cNothing will be willed by Him in contradiction of His nature\u201d<\/p>\n

4.\u00a0 \u201cHuman and divine morality, or goodness, are not independent things\u201d since \u201cgoodness comes directly from the fact of our creation in His image.\u201d<\/p>\n

(2) says that God is the definition of goodness, which again converts \u201cGod is good\u201d into either \u201cGod is God\u201d or \u201cGood is good,\u201d or an analytic statement in which \u201cgood\u201d is not understood independently of God.<\/p>\n

(3) is the statement that God will not act in contradiction to his nature. But of course nothing acts in contradiction to its nature. This is simply stating that God will only do those things that God does. But this is no more informative than saying that fish will only do those things that fish do, which gives us no information about the nature of fish or just what it is they do.\u00a0 In combination with the other statements, it is not clear what is intended by statement (1) other than that of adding a stipulation that things don\u2019t act within their natures because they\u00a0will<\/em>\u00a0it, but only because it is consonant with their natures, which is just a restatement of both (2) and (3).\u00a0 (4) simply reasserts the theist claim, namely, that our sense of right and wrong cannot be understood outside of God\u2019s having given it to us, which is the question at issue, and which forms one leg of the theists\u2019 circular loop :<\/p>\n

(1) We know something is good because it is a reflection of God\u2019s nature within us.<\/p>\n

(2) God\u2019s nature is good.<\/p>\n

(3) We know God\u2019s nature is good because of (1)<\/p>\n

This turns (1) into \u201cwe know something is good because we know it is good.\u201d\u00a0 And turns (3) into \u201cWe know God\u2019s nature is a reflection of God\u2019s nature.\u201d<\/p>\n

The theists\u2019 arguments again reduce to uttering either identity statements or analytic statements\u2014tautologies.\u00a0 The theist\u2019s other recourse is to say, \u201cWell, when you\u2019re dead you\u2019ll know, but then it will be too late.\u201d\u00a0 Of course, this is just the retreat to threats of punishment and promises of reward.\u00a0 Assuming the theist does not want to take the coercion approach, then to escape the preceding tautology the theist needs an independent criterion of good upon which to judge that God is, in fact, good.<\/p>\n

Not so, according to one theist:<\/p>\n

If we derived our judgments of good apart from God, then the theist might be making an independent judgment. But this begs the question. The theist claims that\u00a0God communicates to us our sense of judgment for determining right and wrong.\u00a0 Therefore the standard is not independent but dependent on the very person and ground of morality.\u00a04<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

While being yet another variation of the same tautology already reviewed, this seems to add the additional claim that we gain direct knowledge of goodness in such a way that no independent judgment is or can be made.\u00a0 In other words, we are simply given awareness of good by way of revealed knowledge. This knowledge comes directly from God, bypassing the usual critical faculties (similar to so many revealed truth claims of so many mutually contradictory religions and sects); therefore, no independent judgment or reasoning of any kind is necessary, or perhaps even welcome.\u00a0 Now, exactly how one knows this sense comes from God is not made clear.\u00a0 How does one separate \u201ctrue\u201d revelatory claims from false ones? How do we know this additional revelatory sense is even reliable?\u00a0 More immediately relevant here though is how does one know this sense of good corresponds to what is actually good?\u00a0 This is, after all, the point at issue.\u00a0 Even if one is being fed sensations or knowledge by God, how does one know he isn\u2019t being deceived?\u00a0 In short, How does one know God is in fact good?<\/p>\n

Well, this theist\u2019s answer appears to be simply that God is good because God says He is, and that God is the very \u201cground of morality.\u201d But \u201cground of morality\u201d is just another way of saying \u201cis the standard of good,\u201d or the \u201csource of goodness,\u201d\u00a0 or, once again, \u201cGod is the\u00a0definition<\/em>\u00a0of good.\u201d\u00a0 As usual, we\u2019re right back to \u201cgood\u201d being defined in terms of God, without any independent idea of what \u201cgood\u201d means; therefore, the claim, \u201cGod is good\u201d reduces to the empty truth that \u201cGod is God,\u201d or at most, \u201cGod has God-like properties.\u201d\u00a0 Since God is good by definition, adding that God is good because God is the ground of morality just reduces to \u201cGod is good because God is good,\u201d or, \u201cGod is God-like, because God is God-like.\u201d\u00a0 The statement, \u201cGod is good\u201d is already tautological; repeating that tautology within yet another tautology doesn\u2019t shed much light on the matter.<\/p>\n

Some theists feel that they are not making \u201cgood\u201d and \u201cGod\u201d self-referential in this circular argument sense, but instead, have a logically independent concept of good and take as their starting premise the claim that \u201cGod is perfectly good.\u201d\u00a0 In other words, while they believe that \u201cgood\u201d is an independent concept, it applies to God perfectly and completely.\u00a0 These theists then add that while \u201cgood\u201d exists independently of God, we just aren\u2019t qualified to actually test or judge whether or not God is good in any particular case\u2014we don\u2019t see the\u00a0 \u201cbigger picture.\u201d\u00a0 While it is\u00a0logically<\/em>\u00a0possible for God to be evil, He never is so.\u00a0 The theist claims that we do not know this by experience (since no experience would ever be accepted as counterfactual evidence of God\u2019s goodness), but we know it as a matter of faith.<\/p>\n

What can we say about this approach?\u00a0 First, notice that we still have no idea what good means independently of God.\u00a0 All we can say is that, \u201cX is good because God ordered it, God wants it, etc.\u201d\u00a0 There is no\u00a0conceivable<\/em>\u00a0test of God\u2019s goodness because it is being implicitly defined as whatever God does.\u00a0 In other words, whatever God does is assumed to be good\u00a0a priori<\/em>.\u00a0 This renders the notion of \u201cgood\u201d factually meaningless.\u00a0 The theist seems to be saying that there is an\u00a0independent concept of \u201cgood,\u201d but that we have only a partial understanding of it. However this partial understanding can be\u00a0completely<\/em>\u00a0overridden by God\u2019s \u201cbigger picture\u201d perspective, such as in the Old Testament where God sends two bears to rip apart forty two children for the heinous crime of teasing an old man about being bald (2 Kings 2:23-24).\u00a0 Such a \u201cpartial\u201d conception of good is no conception at all when it can be completely overridden like this.<\/p>\n

Second, even if an intelligible, independent notion of \u201cgood\u201d were being offered, the question as to how one knows that it applies to God is not answered; it is simply assumed on \u201cfaith.\u201d But this hardly clarifies matters since \u201cfaith\u201d is simply a label for the act of a deliberate, bare-faced begging of the question.<\/p>\n

So what does our discussion up to this point say about theists\u2019 supposedly \u201cobjective\u201d and \u201cabsolute\u201d ethics?\u00a0 Well, a theist-dependent ethical system rests on the following.<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0 They feel they should follow what they believe to be God\u2019s will.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0 They \u201cshould\u201d (i.e., ought to) follow God\u2019s will, because they believe God\u2019s will is good.<\/p>\n

3.\u00a0 They believe God\u2019s will is good, because God is the very standard by which good is defined.<\/p>\n

(3), then, is the bedrock of any theistic-dependent ethical system, which I\u2019ve shown to be a tautology: God\u2019s will is good, and \u201cgood\u201d\u00a0means<\/em>\u00a0that which God wills (since He\u2019s the defining standard).\u00a0 To be based on a tautology is to be based on nothing at all.<\/p>\n

Literally any ethical code you care to dream up can be based on an appropriately chosen tautology.\u00a0 For example, let\u2019s look at the application of the very same theistic logic to justify an ethical system based on telepathic space-alien communication.<\/p>\n

\u201cGood\u201d is that which space aliens telepathically communicate to me, and those space alien communications are the very standard of goodness\u2014they are what I mean when I use the word \u201cgood.\u201d\u00a0 Why do I believe these space-aliens are good?\u00a0 Because they say so and because it is a matter of faith.\u00a0 They even say that they are the ground of morality, which I also take as a matter of faith.\u00a0 How do I know that these communications are from space-aliens and not from my own mind?\u00a0 Because I have faith that it is not, and because I don\u2019t make the mistake of trusting my imperfect human reason to judge, question, or close my heart to what they are telling me.\u00a0 When my heart, or my space alien organization, tells me that space-aliens have ordered me to stone adulterers to death (as in the OT), I know that is good, even if it is evil when a human orders such deeds.\u00a0 Why? Well, because the space aliens are the standard of goodness, so if they ordered it, it is good by definition; and also because the space aliens genetically engineered all life on our planet, and since they made us, they can do as they please.\u00a0 After all, do clay pots question the potter who made them?\u00a0 This faith-based commitment is why my ethical system is\u00a0absolute<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Clearly, making a commitment to any such\u00a0absolute<\/em>\u00a0moral system, whether based on space-aliens, one or more gods, or one\u2019s ancestors, can be considered only an extremely\u00a0arbitrary<\/em>\u00a0act.<\/p>\n

The Implications and Conclusion<\/h3>\n

Now, at this point some theists forget their original assertion that non-theistic ethical systems are arbitrary and subjective,\u00a0unlike<\/em>\u00a0their own system.\u00a0 They will then begin to make statements like all \u201cultimate standards are based on tautology.\u201d\u00a0 Some will even go so far as to argue that reason itself is the problem here, that any ethical system is by its very nature based on an irrational commitment, i.e.,\u00a0 based on \u201cfaith,\u201d which is where faith in the Lord Jesus Christ (for Christians) comes in.\u00a0 All things considered, such comments seem like a fairly generous concession to my claim that theistic-based meta-ethics is fundamentally irrational and arbitrary.\u00a0 These theists, having fallen back behind a wall of irrational commitment, do achieve at least one thing they wanted: they can no longer be criticized.\u00a0 But they pay an exorbitant price.\u00a0 They can no longer criticize anyone else for making a\u00a0different<\/em>\u00a0irrational commitment.\u00a0 They can no longer criticize anyone else for choosing a different ethic based on faith in another God (or even the same God in any of the myriad, mutually contradictory Judeo-Christian sects), or political ideology, or even space aliens.\u00a0 Each system becomes equally \u201cjustified\u201d by these irrational appeals to\u00a0faith and\/or revelation, both of which are conveniently \u201cbeyond\u201d reason.<\/p>\n

There is another especially pernicious aspect to ethical systems that depend on God in this way.\u00a0 By pushing concepts of good beyond the scope of reason and equating it with the supposed will of God\u2014whichever of the thousands of interpretations of this Will a theist may be referring to\u2014\u201dgood\u201d becomes something we feel no longer qualified to judge.\u00a0 Since \u201cgood\u201d is equated with God\u2019s nature, and since God\u2019s nature is somehow beyond our capacity for comprehension and critical analysis, then the only way one can know he or she is doing the right thing is to simplyobey<\/em>.\u00a0 Indeed, obedience to rules effectively becomes an end in itself, even if those rules include such things as found in the Old Testament: stoning brides to death who were found not to be\u00a0virgins; sacrificing human infants; slaughtering and enslaving men, women, and children (i.e.,targeting<\/em>\u00a0civilians) \u2013 such as in 1 Sam 15:3, \u201cSlay both man and woman, infant and suckling.\u201d (See my article on this site, The Bible: A Manual for Living?, for these and many other similar references. )<\/p>\n

As we\u2019ve seen, when confronted with what would normally be considered crimes against humanity, the theist will respond in various ways, none of them satisfactory:\u00a0 \u201cWe are His creations, and He can do as He pleases,\u201d or \u201cGod is good regardless of His actions, just in ways that are beyond us.\u201d\u00a0 Stripped of our own ability to know an evil deed when we see it, we now have to first ask:\u00a0 \u201cWho did it?\u201d\u00a0 One is reduced to saying, \u201cI don\u2019t know if it was evil until you first tell me whether or not God did it. I\u2019ll even do the deed myself, no matter how bloody or genocidal, if you first convince me that God ordered it.\u201d\u00a0 Uncritical obedience to orders ultimately becomes the only criterion of moral behavior, even when the rule is infanticide, such as illustrated in Gen 22:2 where Abraham is told to slaughter his own son.\u00a0 Indeed, Abraham\u2019s willingness to blindly follow orders \u2013 even with the tortured, frightened screams of his own child in his ears \u2013 is held up as the supreme example of moral \u201cgoodness\u201d we should all follow.<\/p>\n

If it is true, as some theists claim, that \u201cGod communicates to us our sense of judgment for determining right and wrong,\u201d then shouldn\u2019t we naturally sense moral\u00a0beauty<\/em>\u00a0in these O.T. atrocities, since they were sanctioned by God?\u00a0 Fortunately, few do.\u00a0 But even if our moral instinct is one of revulsion, we are told to remember that good is\u00a0defined<\/em>\u00a0by God. Anything He does is good by definition, no matter what: healing sick children or having them ripped apart by wild animals.\u00a0 Curiously, many Christians have often complained at this point that \u201cthings were different in the Old Testament.\u201d\u00a0 In other words, their \u201cabsolute\u201d morals were different in the past.\u00a0 Such a view ironically turns their absolutism into a rather extreme form of moral\u00a0relativism<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Some theists will argue that the essential difference between the theistic and non-theistic approach is that their approach has ethics deriving from \u201coutside\u201d of ourselves, outside of humanity, which is the only way ethics can be considered objective.\u00a0 This certainly begs the central question: theistic ethics comes from \u201coutside us\u201d only to the extent that God really exists and is the source of morality; otherwise, theistic ethics comes as much from \u201cinside us\u201d as does their sense that God talks to them.\u00a0 Regardless, it is not at all clear that only things \u201coutside us\u201d can be objective.\u00a0 After all, the fact that humans have two eyes is an objective fact even though it does not exist \u201coutside\u201d humans\u2014it is an observable, testable, and therefore, objective fact about our natures, about what it means to be human. But if the theist is right, if one can be objectively moral only if those morals exist or derive from \u201coutside\u201d of the individual, then God, by exactly the same logic, cannot be said to be a moral being\u2014unless, of course, the theist is saying that morals derive from outside of God.\u00a05<\/sup>\u00a0\u00a0 This is where special pleading is typically introduced.\u00a0 The theist will simply exempt themselves from their own rules:\u00a0 \u201cYour explanation must meet these conditions; however, my explanation (God) does not.\u201d\u00a0 Such flagrant tactics are, of course, unavoidable since the theist is contradicting his or her own assumptions.<\/p>\n

Some have argued that since God is both perfect and omniscient, then His morals are perfect and therefore truly\u00a0objective<\/em>\u00a0in a way that would not be possible for imperfect humans.\u00a0 In addition to confusing the notions of \u201cobjective\u201d with \u201cperfection,\u201d this approach quickly becomes incoherent, and again begs a central question. First, the notion of omniscience undermines the idea that God has free will:\u00a0 If He knows all of His future actions and decisions, then He is not free to change them; if he doesn\u2019t yet know his future actions, then he is not omniscient.\u00a0 Second, the existence of natural evil (disease, earthquakes, etc.) contradicts any meaningful notion of God\u2019s goodness in light of his supposed omnipotence.\u00a0 Either he can prevent infants from dying slowly of parasitic microorganisms (creatures He presumably designed for just this purpose) and refuses to, in which case He is not good; or He can\u2019t prevent it, in which case He is not all-powerful.\u00a0 Third, whether or not we always do accurately discover what is morally right for us does not, in and of itself, alter the fact that there is something objectively right for us.\u00a0 For example, if we erroneously concluded that certain foods were good for us that were actually poisonous, then we\u00a0 would die.\u00a0 In other words, our capacity for error does not alter the fact that there are objectively poisonous things for us to eat, as well as healthy things for us to eat.\u00a0 Finally, of course, this again begs a central question, namely that of God\u2019s existence as a perfect and good being.<\/p>\n

One thing we haven\u2019t addressed up to this point is the implicit theist assumption that if we accepted their meta-ethical theory, then we would suddenly know what the moral \u201crules\u201d are\u2014presumably through faith or revelation.\u00a0 This is certainly an amazing assumption when one considers that the number of Christian sects is well into thousands, let alone the fact that the whole of this internally bickering Christendom represents only a minority of the world\u2019s religions.\u00a0 As the basis for an \u201cabsolute\u201d ethical system it leaves much unexplained about how to tell the \u201cright\u201d interpretation of God\u2019s Will from the many, many \u201cwrong\u201d ones.\u00a0 Presumably choosing the \u201cright\u201d interpretation is as much an application of irrational commitment (i.e., faith) as choosing to believe in the particular deity(ies) in the first place.\u00a0 Such an approach leaves us with precisely what we would expect:\u00a0 an anarchy of \u201cabsolute\u201d moral systems and religious codes, each of which proclaims itself \u201cobjective and absolute\u201d and \u201cabove\u201d mere human reason (and therefore immune to rational debate and\u00a0investigation).\u00a0 So when a member of any of these countless belief systems points to the non-theist and proclaims \u201cyou have an arbitrary and unjustified moral code\u201d I can\u2019t help but think of the biblical story to the effect that only he who is without sin should cast the first stone.<\/p>\n

We\u2019ve shown the fatal flaws in any God-based meta-ethical theory, but where does that leave us? Is there no basis for ethics at all, or are we forced to accept some relativistic one?\u00a0 I explore what I believe is an objective, naturalistic meta-ethical theory in the article,\u00a0Darwinian Meta Ethics<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n

1<\/sup>\u00a0Critic from <http:\/\/groups.yahoo.com\/group\/vantil-applied>, forwarded to me via personal correspondence by Dawson Bethrick.<\/p>\n

2<\/sup>\u00a0Kai Nielsen,\u00a0Ethics Without God<\/em>, (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1990), p.59.<\/p>\n

3<\/sup>\u00a0Bill Hale, personal correspondence.<\/p>\n

4<\/sup>\u00a0Critic from vantil-applied.<\/p>\n

5<\/sup>\u00a0Dawson Bethrick shared this observation with me in a personal correspondence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This is one of my favourite essays on the subject of morality and God. It is by P. Wesley Edwards and can be found variously online, such as here. JohnM was espousing the idea in his comments here that under an atheistic worldview, there is no moral foundation. Moreover, as the argument goes, only God can provide a sound underpinning for morality. In this essay, Edwards shows how this tack is circular and thus incoherent. As ever, let me know what you think.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[75,280],"class_list":["post-1179","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-morality","tag-morality-2","tag-theism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1179","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1179"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1179\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1179"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1179"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/tippling\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1179"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}