<\/p>\n
1.\u00a0 Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n In How to argue about gods<\/a>, I stated my intention to construct a series on the arguments of natural theology.\u00a0 This is the first post in that series, and it will cover the Ontological Argument<\/a>, as defended by William Lane Craig.<\/p>\n Before we begin, I\u2019d like you to have a good think about your answers to the following questions:<\/p>\n Q1.<\/strong>\u00a0 Do you think it\u2019s possible that God exists?<\/p>\n Q2.<\/strong>\u00a0 Do you think it\u2019s possible that God doesn\u2019t exist?<\/p>\n Despite the simple language, there are a few terms (specifically,\u00a0God<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0possible<\/em>) whose precise meanings could potentially change your answers.\u00a0 I\u2019ll get to this shortly but, for the moment, it suffices to give your answers according to your intuitive understanding of the questions.\u00a0 You might have answered\u00a0Yes<\/em>\u00a0to both questions.\u00a0 You might have answered\u00a0Yes<\/em>\u00a0to one and\u00a0No<\/em>\u00a0to the other; in this case, you probably already have your mind made up about the existence of God!\u00a0 It seems obvious that there is only one prohibited pair of answers: you cannot logically answer\u00a0No<\/em>\u00a0to both.<\/p>\n The first thing to note when discussing the Ontological Argument is that there are actually several very different ontological arguments, and I will most likely consider some or all of the others in future posts.\u00a0 (For a very thorough discussion, see Graham Oppy\u2019s books Ontological Arguments and Belief in God<\/a>\u00a0and Arguing About Gods<\/a>.)\u00a0 But the argument usually known as\u00a0The<\/em>\u00a0Ontological Argument goes back to St Anselm of Canterbury<\/a>, and I will be focusing on an adaptation of Anselm\u2019s argument<\/a> presented by William Lane Craig in this lecture<\/a>\u00a0and this debate<\/a>.\u00a0 (Craig very rarely defends this argument in public debates; I\u2019ve only seen it in that one debate, against Victor Stenger.\u00a0 This debate was also noteworthy for Craig\u2019s decision not to defend the Fine Tuning Argument; this is a pity because Stenger, a noted physicist, has written extensively on the Fallacy of Fine Tuning<\/a>, and it would have been interesting to see Craig pit himself against an expert in the field.) \u00a0Craig’s formulation of the argument is very similar to Alvin Plantinga’s<\/a>, and the critiques I present here apply equally well to Plantinga.<\/p>\n 2.\u00a0 What does God mean?<\/strong><\/p>\n Before outlining the argument, Craig defines a key term:<\/p>\n \u201cGod<\/strong>\u00a0is, by definition, the greatest being conceivable.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n In an effort to help his audience grasp this concept, he adds:<\/p>\n \u201cIf you could conceive of anything greater than God, then\u00a0that<\/em>\u00a0would be God\u201d,<\/p>\n even though it makes precisely as much sense to say:<\/p>\n \u201cA zillion is the largest number.\u00a0 If there was a number\u00a0larger than a zillion, then\u00a0that<\/em>\u00a0would be a zillion.\u201d<\/p>\n This makes me wonder if Craig truly understands the concept of\u00a0Maximality<\/em>, but I will speak more about this in a later post where I will also devote some attention to the troublesome notion of Greatness<\/em>. \u00a0Craig then considers some of the consequences of such a definition.\u00a0 To be the greatest conceivable being:<\/p>\n \u201cGod would therefore be all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good and would exist in every logically possible world.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n According to Craig, anything less could not be the greatest conceivable being, and this seems reasonable to me. \u00a0(Perhaps I would object that it is problematic for Craig to use “good” as a measure of greatness here since, for example, in his debate with Sam Harris<\/a>, he states that “God\u2019s own holy and loving nature provides the absolute standard against which all actions are measured”, so that to say “God is maximally good” is just to say “God’s nature is maximally like God’s nature”.\u00a0 I won’t dwell on this issue here, though, as it is not central to my argument.) \u00a0Note that a maximally great being might have other properties; for example, it might enjoy watching basketball but not tennis. \u00a0But the properties listed above are among the essential ones.<\/p>\n It is very important to realise that many theists might believe in a God that would not conform to Craig\u2019s definition.\u00a0 For example, you might believe that the universe was created by a\u00a0very<\/em>\u00a0powerful – but not\u00a0all<\/em>-powerful – creator; or you might believe that this being knows\u00a0a lot –<\/em>\u00a0but not\u00a0everything<\/em>.\u00a0 I will come back to this point a few times throughout the post.\u00a0 Suffice it to say, even if I could successfully prove that there was no God, according to Craig\u2019s definition, I may not have proved that\u00a0your<\/em>\u00a0God doesn\u2019t exist.<\/p>\n Now that we have Craig\u2019s definition of God in mind, there is one more term we need to consider before we move on to the argument itself. \u00a0In the above quote, Craig mentions\u00a0logically possible worlds<\/em>. \u00a0If you are not familiar with this notion, the Wikipedia page on\u00a0Modal Logic<\/a>\u00a0provides a brief but technical overview; the page on Logical Possibility<\/a> is helpful too.\u00a0 For this post, it is enough to understand a \u201clogically possible world\u201d to mean a non-contradictory state of affairs in some self-contained realm of existence. \u00a0An even simpler way to understand the concept would be “a way the world could have been”. \u00a0Such a world could be very much like ours, or very different, even to the point of having different physical laws; but it must not have any logical contradictions built into it. \u00a0(Some philosophers, the\u00a0Modal Realists<\/a>, think that all possible worlds have a real existence, just like ours does, with possible worlds being somewhat like causally isolated universes in a larger multiverse.)<\/p>\n It is now worth going back to questions Q1 and Q2 which, in Craig’s language, can be rephrased as follows:<\/p>\n Q1.<\/strong>\u00a0 Do you think it\u2019s logically possible that the greatest being conceivable exists?<\/p>\n Q2.<\/strong>\u00a0 Do you think it\u2019s logically possible that the greatest being conceivable doesn\u2019t exist?<\/p>\n Why not pause again to consider your answers to these questions.\u00a0 Have your answers changed from before? \u00a0From this point onwards, when I refer to Q1 or Q2, it will be these rephrased versions that I have in mind.<\/p>\n 3.\u00a0 Craig\u2019s Ontological Argument<\/strong><\/p>\n Now it\u2019s time to delve into Craig\u2019s formulation of the argument.\u00a0 This is how he puts it:<\/p>\n (Note that Craig blurs the distinction between the terms \u201cgreatest being conceivable\u201d and \u201cmaximally great being\u201d.\u00a0 Although there do appear to be some subtle differences, it will not be important to dwell on them here, so I will follow Craig and use the terms interchangeably myself.)<\/p>\n As you can see, the first premise amounts to a positive answer to Q1.\u00a0 And Craig correctly assures us that Steps 2-7 are “relatively uncontroversial”.\u00a0 (The trickiest part of the argument is Step 3, which involves an application of what is known as\u00a0S5 Modal Logic<\/a>.\u00a0 A fairly informal justification of Step 3 might go something like this… \u00a0Suppose a maximally great being B exists in some possible world W. \u00a0Then,\u00a0by the consequences of the definition of\u00a0maximally great<\/em>\u00a0as noted above by Craig,\u00a0it would be true for anyone living in W to say “B exists in every logically possible world”. \u00a0Hence, it is true\u00a0to say that B exists in every possible world.)<\/p>\n So, as Craig notes, the whole argument hinges on the first premise, and he says:<\/p>\n \u201cThe whole question is Premise 1.\u00a0 Is God\u2019s existence possible?\u00a0\u00a0Well, what do you think?\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>The atheist has to maintain that it\u2019s\u00a0impossible<\/em>\u00a0that God exists.\u00a0 He has to say that the concept of God is logically incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor, or a round square.\u00a0 But the problem is that the concept of God just doesn\u2019t appear to be incoherent in that way.\u00a0 The idea of a being which is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good in every logically possible world seems perfectly coherent.\u00a0 Moreover, as we\u2019ve seen, there are other arguments for God\u2019s existence which at least suggest that it\u2019s at least logically possible that God exists.\u00a0\u00a0So I\u2019ll simply leave it to you tonight.\u00a0 Do you think that it\u2019s possible that God exists?<\/strong>\u00a0 \u00a0If you do, then it follows logically that God does exist.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n (I\u2019ll come back later to the question of whether it is logically coherent to speak of an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being that exists in every logically possible world.) \u00a0Given that Craig points out that the whole argument comes down to Premise 1, you\u2019d think he\u2019d give a pretty strong defense of that premise, wouldn\u2019t you?\u00a0 But instead, he simply asks the question \u201cWhat do you think?<\/em>\u201d, and just leaves it up to his audience members to intuitively decide.\u00a0 (I\u2019ll show in later posts that Craig relies on the gut feelings of his audience in every single one of his arguments.)<\/p>\n Regardless of what you think about the first premise, if we grant the validity of S5 Modal Logic, the above argument serves as a proof of the following proposition:<\/p>\n Proposition 1. \u00a0<\/strong>A positive answer to Q1 would entail the existence of God.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n 4.\u00a0 Equivocation<\/strong><\/p>\n For the time being, I\u2019ll leave the question of whether we should accept Premise 1 or not.\u00a0 But it is important to consider this statement from the above quote:<\/p>\n \u201cMoreover, as we\u2019ve seen, there are other arguments for God\u2019s existence which at least suggest that it\u2019s at least logically possible that God exists.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Here, amazingly, Craig is equivocating on the word \u201cGod\u201d.\u00a0 The other arguments Craig refers to are:<\/p>\n (I explain the idea of equivocation in Section 2 of\u00a0How to argue about gods<\/a>.)\u00a0 I say that Craig is equivocating in this statement because these arguments do nothing to establish the existence of the\u00a0greatest being conceivable<\/em>.\u00a0 Even if we grant the conclusion of these arguments (and I do not intend to imply that I think there is good reason to do so), we would believe that there exists a being that created the universe, set its parameters, decided what would be right and wrong, and arranged for Jesus to rise from the dead.\u00a0 The astute reader will notice that these conclusions do not entail that such a being is the greatest being conceivable<\/em>.\u00a0 As I mentioned above, you might believe that the universe was created by a\u00a0very<\/em>\u00a0powerful being, but not an\u00a0all<\/em>-powerful being; you might call this being\u00a0God<\/em>, but Craig would not, at least not according to his definition that we are working with.\u00a0 In particular, when Craig asks the question<\/p>\n \u201cDo you think it\u2019s possible that God exists?<\/em>\u201d,<\/p>\n he is\u00a0not<\/em>\u00a0asking the question<\/p>\n \u201cDo you think it\u2019s possible that the universe had a creator?<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n He is asking the question<\/p>\n “Do you think it’s possible that an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being exists in every logically possible world?<\/em>“<\/p>\n (I won\u2019t speculate here as to whether it was Craig\u2019s intention for his audience to mistakenly confuse these questions.) \u00a0It may also be the case that Craig implicitly equivocates on the word “possible” when he asks<\/p>\n Do you think it’s possible that God exists?,<\/em><\/p>\n or at least hopes his audience will confuse\u00a0logical possibility<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>with the more everyday meaning of the word\u00a0possible<\/em> when considering their answer. \u00a0An untrained audience is very likely to mistakenly interpret this question as being the opposite of “Are you certain there is no God?<\/em>“, and Craig would know this very well. \u00a0Again, I won’t speculate as to Craig’s intentions, as this really is a side issue. \u00a0But I do intend to devote a future post to the idea of swapping between meanings of the word\u00a0possible<\/em> in order to “prove” some rather remarkable (and demonstrably false) things.<\/p>\n 5. \u00a0The Dual Ontological Argument<\/strong><\/p>\n As I have already stressed, Craig\u2019s Ontological Argument assumes a positive answer to Q1 as its first premise.\u00a0 But what happens if we assume a positive answer to Q2 instead?\u00a0 This is what happens:<\/p>\n Wow!\u00a0 The exact same logic implies that God doesn\u2019t exist!\u00a0 Let\u2019s call the above argument the Dual Ontological Argument.\u00a0 Again, the trickiest step in this argument is Step 3, and this time I think it is worth giving its proper justification:<\/p>\n With this justification in place, we see that Steps 2-7 of the Dual Ontological Argument are exactly as uncontroversial as Steps 2-7 of Craig\u2019s Ontological Argument.\u00a0 In what follows, I will paraphrase Craig\u2019s words from above (but ignore his incorrect statement about the relevance of his other theistic arguments):<\/p>\n The whole question is Premise 1.\u00a0\u00a0Well, what do you think?<\/strong>\u00a0 The theist has to maintain that it\u2019s impossible that God doesn\u2019t exist.\u00a0 He has to say that the very idea of there being no God is logically incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor, or a round square.\u00a0 But the problem is that the concept of there being no God just doesn\u2019t appear to be incoherent in that way.\u00a0 The idea that there is not a being that is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good in every logically possible world seems perfectly coherent.\u00a0\u00a0So I\u2019ll simply leave it to you tonight. \u00a0Do you think that it\u2019s possible that God doesn\u2019t exist?<\/strong>\u00a0 If you do, then it follows logically that God doesn\u2019t exist.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n It is important to remember that these words still refer to \u201cGod\u201d as the maximally great being defined by Craig.\u00a0 So the question<\/p>\n \u201cDo you think it\u2019s possible that God doesn\u2019t exist?<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n should\u00a0not<\/em>\u00a0be confused with the question<\/p>\n \u201cDo you think it\u2019s possible that the universe didn\u2019t have a creator?<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n You could quite well think that the universe had a creator, but not think that this creator was all-<\/em>powerful,<\/em> all<\/em>-knowing and all<\/em>-good in every<\/em> logically possible world.<\/p>\n Again, whatever your opinion of the validity of its first premise, the Dual Ontological Argument certainly furnishes a proof of the following proposition:<\/p>\n Proposition 2. \u00a0<\/strong>A positive answer to Q2 would entail the non-existence of God.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n 6.\u00a0 Does God exist?<\/strong><\/p>\n So far, we have seen that, assuming the validity of S5 Modal Logic, it is possible to prove the following two propositions:<\/p>\n Proposition 1.<\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0A positive answer to Q1 would entail the existence of God.<\/em><\/p>\n Proposition 2.<\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0A positive answer to Q2 would entail the non-existence of God.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n To me, the most interesting outcome of all this is that, since God cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, it is not possible for both Q1 and Q2 to have a positive answer!\u00a0 And I have already noted that it is not possible for both Q1 and Q2 to have a negative answer.\u00a0 So it follows that one, and only one, of Q1 and Q2 has a positive answer.\u00a0 But which one?!<\/p>\n It is perhaps worth stating the questions again:<\/p>\n Q1.\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>Do you think it\u2019s logically possible that the greatest being conceivable exists?<\/p>\n Q2.\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>Do you think it\u2019s logically possible that the greatest being conceivable doesn\u2019t exist?<\/p>\n Now, I don\u2019t claim to\u00a0know<\/em>\u00a0which of Q1 or Q2 has a positive answer.\u00a0 But I do have a very strong leaning towards Q2, and I\u2019ll attempt to argue my case shortly.\u00a0 Note that, as I keep stressing, this doesn\u2019t mean I believe the universe didn\u2019t have a creator. \u00a0Although I don\u2019t have a belief in a creator, I do not have enough information to form a reasonable belief that the universe doesn\u2019t have one. \u00a0(For example, even if all the evidence pointed towards there being no creator, how could one rule out the possibility that the universe was created by an omni-shy being, who didn’t want anyone to know him, and therefore made it look like he didn’t exist?) \u00a0But I certainly don\u2019t think it is obviously logically impossible, if the universe\u00a0does<\/em>\u00a0have a creator, for that creator not to be maximally great.\u00a0 As I have now said a few times, perhaps the universe has a\u00a0very<\/em>\u00a0powerful creator, but not an\u00a0all<\/em>-powerful creator.<\/p>\n So let\u2019s try and decide between Q1 and Q2.\u00a0 Let\u2019s first note what a positive answer to each question would entail:<\/p>\n Yes to Q1:<\/strong>\u00a0 There exists a logically possible world in which there is an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being (which, by definition, must in fact exist in all logically possible worlds).<\/p>\n Yes to Q2:\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>There exists a logically possible world in which there is no all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being (which, therefore, doesn\u2019t exist in all possible worlds).<\/strong><\/p>\n It should be noted that the Evidential Problem of Evil<\/a> directly confronts the former situation.\u00a0 A proper treatment of this argument will have to wait for another occasion but, roughly stated, it asserts that the sheer amount of gratuitous (human and animal) suffering we observe in the world is incompatible with the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being who, supposedly, would want to reduce the suffering, would know how to do so, and would be able to do so.\u00a0 As such, anyone that deems this argument successful could not give a positive answer to Q1.\u00a0 Many philosophers consider the argument insurmountable.<\/p>\n But let\u2019s not dwell on the Evidential Problem of Evil because, as I said, now is not the time for a proper discussion of it.\u00a0 Instead, let\u2019s address Q2 directly.<\/p>\n Does there exist a logically possible world in which there is no all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being?<\/em><\/p>\n I don\u2019t see why not.\u00a0 What about:<\/p>\n None of these worlds appear to me to be logically impossible, and none of the beings described in these worlds are maximally great.\u00a0 All manner of other logically possible worlds could be described in which there does not exist an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being.<\/p>\n But these are just a few ideas off the top of my head that lead me to think that a positive answer can be more likely given to Q2 than Q1.\u00a0 What must a theist do to justify a negative<\/em> answer to Q2?\u00a0 Well, as I have shown, if he would like to think that God exists, according to Craig\u2019s definition, he must show that there is\u00a0no logically possible world<\/em>\u00a0lacking an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being (and, further, that all logically possible worlds must have precisely the same<\/em> maximally great being).\u00a0 So not only must he show that each and every one of the worlds described above are logically impossible, he must in fact show that there are\u00a0no<\/em>\u00a0logically possible worlds without such a being.<\/p>\n So it seems most likely to me that the answer to Q2 is\u00a0Yes<\/em>.\u00a0 And this, as we have seen, entails that there is no maximally great being \u2013 in our world or in any other world.<\/p>\n 7.\u00a0 Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n So what are we to make of all this?\u00a0 If my arguments are deemed sound, does this settle the\u00a0God Question<\/em>\u00a0once and for all?\u00a0 I do not think so.<\/p>\n I believe that the problem with Craig\u2019s Ontological Argument is that it requires too strong a definition of\u00a0God<\/em>.\u00a0 \u00a0In order to make the argument work, God must be assumed to be\u00a0all<\/em>-powerful,\u00a0all<\/em>-knowing,\u00a0all<\/em>-good and to exist in\u00a0all<\/em>\u00a0logically possible worlds.\u00a0 But, as we have seen, the very possibility of such a remarkable being\u00a0not<\/em>\u00a0existing logically entails its non-existence.\u00a0 And it seems quite obvious to me that there could be a logically possible world without such a being.<\/p>\n So, is there therefore no God?\u00a0 Again, I don\u2019t think I have answered this question.\u00a0 But I think I have provided a strong case against the existence of an\u00a0all<\/em>-powerful,\u00a0all<\/em>-knowing,\u00a0all<\/em>-good being that exists in\u00a0all<\/em>\u00a0logically possible worlds.\u00a0 And this might not be your God.\u00a0 It certainly isn\u2019t the God of Christianity<\/a>, despite what most Christians would say.<\/p>\n\n
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