{"id":150,"date":"2012-08-18T14:09:08","date_gmt":"2012-08-18T14:09:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.skepticblogs.com\/reasonablyfaithless\/?p=150"},"modified":"2012-08-18T14:09:08","modified_gmt":"2012-08-18T14:09:08","slug":"richard-dawkins-reason-and-the-is-ought-problem","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/reasonablyfaithless\/2012\/08\/18\/richard-dawkins-reason-and-the-is-ought-problem\/","title":{"rendered":"Richard Dawkins, Reason and the Is-Ought “Problem”"},"content":{"rendered":"

I recently read an article entitled\u00a0Is Richard Dawkins a Bully?<\/em>,1<\/sup> in which Neil Ormerod (Professor of Theology at the Australian Catholic University) takes aim at Dawkins’ objective as stated in the preface to his book\u00a0The God Delusion:<\/em><\/p>\n

If this book works as I intend, the religious readers who open it will be atheists when they put it down.<\/em>2<\/sup><\/p>\n

Dawkins\u2019 intention in the book is to show that religion is irrational and, hence, that the religious should abandon their beliefs.\u00a0 Rather than attempting to refute Dawkins\u2019 arguments against religion, Ormerod\u2019s article identifies and critiques a key assumption in Dawkins’ approach:<\/p>\n

[W]e can also ask how Dawkins himself would account for this sense of normativity that demands we act in a rational manner which he implicitly holds.<\/em><\/p>\n

And later:<\/p>\n

How then might Dawkins construe the apparently purposeful appeal to live according to the dictates of reason that is implicit in the aims of his book?<\/em><\/p>\n

In other words: if reason says that something\u00a0(such as Christianity) is\u00a0false, then on what grounds can it be said that one ought not believe that thing? \u00a0Ormerod is claiming that Dawkins is\u00a0running into David Hume’s famous\u00a0Is-Ought Problem<\/em>3<\/sup> which, very roughly, states that one cannot deduce an\u00a0Ought<\/em> from an\u00a0Is<\/em>.4<\/sup><\/p>\n

In my interactions with religious folk, I am often confronted with the same question.\u00a0 If I implore a Christian to read the work of critical Biblical scholars and not only that of Christian apologists, I am sometimes asked:\u00a0 Where do you get this moral imperative<\/em> from?\u00a0 Why do you think I should<\/em> do that?\u00a0 Even if such research would<\/em> lead one to conclude that Christianity is false, why should<\/em> a Christian pursue it?\u00a0 Where do you get your Ought<\/em> from?<\/p>\n

Well, I should say up front that I tend to agree that Is Statements<\/em>\u00a0cannot validly imply Ought Statements<\/em>, if by an Ought Statement<\/em>\u00a0we mean an Unrestricted Ought Statement<\/em>: one that objectively compels us to act in a certain way.\u00a0 However, I do not believe there is any evidence for the existence of valid\u00a0Unrestricted Ought Statements<\/em>.\u00a0 And neither do I think a theist can rightly claim that there are any of these.\u00a0 For example, if one tries to ground Unrestricted Ought\u00a0Statements<\/em>\u00a0in the commands of their God, one is then faced with the question \u201cWhy ought we obey God\u2019s commands?<\/em>\u201d.\u00a0 If one answers \u201cBecause disobedience leads to punishment<\/em>,\u201d then one is faced with the question \u201cWhy ought one behave in a way that avoids punishment?<\/em>\u201d.\u00a0 It seems that these considerations lead to Restricted Ought\u00a0Statements<\/em>\u00a0like “If you do not wish to go to hell, then you should obey God’s commandments.”<\/em><\/p>\n

To further explain, consider a simple statement like:<\/p>\n

S1: You ought not put your hand in a fire<\/em>.<\/p>\n

I think most of us would agree with this principle (modulo some contrived special cases).\u00a0 This then might appear to be a valid\u00a0Unrestricted Ought Statement<\/em>.\u00a0 Now, if someone asked why <\/em>we ought not put a hand in a fire, you could reply by detailing the damage that would be caused if one did put their hand in the fire.\u00a0 However, a mere description<\/em> of the damage a fire will cause your hand does not directly support the prescription<\/em> that one ought not<\/em> put their hand in a fire.<\/p>\n

So why do we believe the statement?\u00a0 Is there some transcendent Law Giver that has declared it Objectively Bad to put your hand in a fire?\u00a0 I don\u2019t think so.\u00a0 Rather, I think that statement S1 is just an abbreviation for the Restricted Ought Statement<\/em>:<\/p>\n

S2: If you value the proper functioning of your hand, then you ought not put it in a fire.<\/em><\/p>\n

Here, the Ought<\/em> is preceded by an all-important If<\/em>.\u00a0 The sentence says that if having a properly functioning hand is one of your goals, then it makes sense not to put it in a fire (again, modulo contrived exceptions).\u00a0 To do otherwise would be to deliberately act against your goal. \u00a0And it is these kinds of Restricted Ought Statements<\/em>\u00a0that I believe can be properly derived from Is Statements<\/em>.<\/p>\n

But why is it that we tend to speak of Unrestricted Ought Statements<\/em>?\u00a0 Well, if you were talking to a typical human being, you would not need to include the words \u201cIf you value the proper functioning of your hand<\/em>\u201d when making your exhortation to be careful around fires.\u00a0 It would normally be safe to assume that retaining the use of one\u2019s hands is a goal of any person you were addressing.\u00a0 This gives us cause to abbreviate statement S2 to S1.<\/p>\n

Hopefully the connection to Ormerod\u2019s critique of Dawkins should be clear.\u00a0 Consider the statement:<\/p>\n

S3: One ought not believe something if reason shows it to be false.<\/em><\/p>\n

This is basically what Dawkins is advocating.\u00a0 But S3 is really an abbreviation for the more convoluted statement:<\/p>\n

S4: If one values believing true things and not believing false things, and if one believes that reason\u2019s inferences are true, then one ought not believe something if reason shows it to be false.<\/em><\/p>\n

As in the analogy of the hand in the fire, it is safe to assume that virtually every person values truth and reason.\u00a0 If you are speaking to such a person, there is no real need to state S4 instead of S3.\u00a0 On the other hand, if you are speaking to a person that does not value truth or reason, then you have no reason to expect a meaningful dialogue. \u00a0Sam Harris put this very nicely in his debate with William Lane Craig:<\/p>\n

If someone doesn\u2019t value evidence, what evidence are you going to provide to prove that they should value it? If someone doesn\u2019t value logic, what logical argument could you provide to show the importance of logic?<\/em>5<\/sup><\/p>\n

In summary, I think it is plausible to suppose that any seemingly valid\u00a0Unrestricted\u00a0<\/em>Ought Statement<\/em>\u00a0is really an abbreviation of a corresponding (but not necessarily unique)\u00a0Restricted Ought Statement<\/em>; one that is qualified by an appeal to a person\u2019s values.\u00a0 I intend to pursue this issue at greater length in a series of posts on morality.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Is Richard Dawkins a Bully?<\/a><\/em> Neil Ormerod.<\/li>\n
  2. The God Delusion<\/a>.<\/em> Richard Dawkins.<\/li>\n
  3. See the Wikipedia entry on the Is-Ought Problem<\/a>.<\/li>\n
  4. Ormerod\u2019s article covers a lot of ground that I won\u2019t address here; my main interest is in this claim.<\/li>\n
  5. Sam Harris vs William Lane Craig. \u00a0Live debate:\u00a0Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?<\/a>\u00a0 Harris’ quote may be found here<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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