{"id":18,"date":"2012-09-06T11:39:55","date_gmt":"2012-09-06T11:39:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.skepticblogs.com\/notung\/?p=18"},"modified":"2013-11-14T07:37:44","modified_gmt":"2013-11-14T07:37:44","slug":"thoughts-on-the-moral-argument-i-objective-moral-values-exist","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/2012\/09\/06\/thoughts-on-the-moral-argument-i-objective-moral-values-exist\/","title":{"rendered":"Thoughts on the Moral Argument I. &#8216;Objective Moral Values Exist&#8217;."},"content":{"rendered":"<p>William Lane Craig\u2019s version of the Moral Argument goes something like this:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>If objective moral values exist then God exists.<\/li>\n<li>Objective moral values exist.<\/li>\n<li>Therefore God exists.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>I think there is room for reasonable doubt on both of the premises, but in this post I\u2019ll only consider the second premise \u2013 that moral values are objective.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>This is an argument <em>for<\/em> the existence of God and so it is not incumbent on the atheist to give a robust moral theory in order to object to this premise. All that is needed is to show that there is reasonable doubt as to its truth. By \u2018objective\u2019 we mean mind-independent, and so by giving a reasonably plausible account of morals in terms of the mind (\u2018subjectivism\u2019) we undermine the idea that there are objective moral values. I\u2019ll start by outlining one possible account of moral subjectivism. This is not \u2018the atheist view\u2019, as atheists may hold a variety of different beliefs about the nature of morality (including that objective moral values exist). My purpose is to show that we can make sense of morals without appealing to <em>objective<\/em> values.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>So what sort of thing are \u2018subjective values\u2019? To answer this, consider aesthetic values. I don\u2019t think it is controversial to say that aesthetic values are subjective \u2013 what we mean when we say something like \u201cBeethoven\u2019s Ninth is a great symphony\u201d is that we hold it in great esteem, perhaps as a result of our enjoying hearing it, or admiration for the skill with which it was written. If there are no minds then there is nothing that can appreciate it, and so there are no such aesthetic values. I propose that morality is something like this. When we say \u201ckilling is wrong\u201d we mean that we <em>find killing to be wrong<\/em>, just as we hold the Ninth in high regard. This might be as a result of empathy for the victims and their relatives, or the consideration of the brutality of the act itself. Whatever the reason, there are some actions that when duly considered by a human mind, are viewed with extreme disapproval.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>It is at this point that objections usually rear their head. \u201cWhat about events like the Holocaust? If moral subjectivism is true then, since the Nazis thought what they were doing was \u2018right\u2019, we cannot say our disapproval is any more \u2018correct\u2019 then their approval. It is simply a matter of taste.\u201d Our hypothesis might answer this by biting the bullet \u2013 yes there is not one opinion more \u2018correct\u2019 than the other, as these values are by nature subjective. But why should this be a problem, unless we assume from the outset that moral values are objective? The assumption seems to be that if we concede that there are no objective moral facts then we should also concede that we are not justified in seeing any particular act as \u2018wrong\u2019. However that doesn\u2019t seem to follow. Just because the philistine\u2019s view that Beethoven\u2019s Ninth is \u2018trashy musak\u2019 might be no more \u2018incorrect\u2019 than my own, it doesn\u2019t follow that I should abandon my view that it is a great symphony. I don\u2019t even have to accept the crude idea that \u2018it is just a matter of taste\u2019. <em>Many<\/em> people hold the Ninth in high esteem, and calling it \u2018trash\u2019 just seems plain <em>weird<\/em>, even for those who don\u2019t usually listen to orchestral symphonies. Our minds are such (either by their own nature or by the conditions of our upbringing) that we tend to appreciate certain aesthetics more than others. We can argue about the worth of artistic works, and there is a sense in which we see those who do not agree with our view as being \u2018wrong\u2019 to do so. In the same way, the vast majority of us disapprove of criminal acts like murder and theft. While there is a minority who do not see it that way, we are still entitled to our view that sees such acts as morally wrong. According to our hypothesis, that does not mean that it is not a subjective value, just as our view that the philistine is wrong about the Ninth is a subjective judgement.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s pick a more extreme example. Suppose the Nazis wiped out everyone on Earth apart from those who agree with them. Then the universal view would be that anti-semitic genocide is \u2018right\u2019. Does this mean that there is no sense in which their actions are \u2018wrong\u2019? No it doesn\u2019t. Even though we do not exist in <em>that<\/em> possible world, from our vantage point in the actual world we are still entitled to make the subjective judgement that their actions are wrong. It might be true that <em>in that world<\/em> there is nobody to see the Nazis\u2019 actions as wrong, but it does not follow from that fact that I should concede they are \u2018right\u2019, as I am making an independent moral judgement based on my own moral views. So I do not think that the example is particularly worrying for moral subjectivism.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Another objection may go as follows: \u201cyour hypothesis talking about \u2018seeing actions as being wrong\u2019 but does not account for why things are <em>really<\/em> wrong. Raping a child is not <em>really<\/em> wrong on your view but just \u2018seen as wrong\u2019, which is counter-intuitive\u201d. This is a legitimate worry \u2013 that subjectivists are \u2018downplaying\u2019 the wrongness of terrible acts like rape. However, this view is committed to a belief that I think is mistaken, namely that if something is subjective then it is not real. I don\u2019t think it is right to say that just because something may be wrong <em>subjectively<\/em> then it isn\u2019t wrong at all. All we mean is that it isn\u2019t wrong in an <em>objective<\/em> sense, but that is the very question we are discussing \u2013 the objection really just amounts to an assertion that moral values are objective, which begs the question. We might find it <em>counter-intuitive<\/em> that moral values are subjective, but it seems plausible the force and liveliness of our moral feelings make it seem that way \u2013 we disapprove of things like rape so strongly that we think we are accessing some objective moral truth.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>This is just an outline of just one account of subjective morality, which I think is sufficient to cast reasonable doubt on the premise that objective moral values exist. To rescue this premise, the theist must both show why the hypothesis I outlined does not successfully account for morality, and provide strong reasons why morals <em>must be<\/em> objective. It is not sufficient to poke holes in just one subjectivist theory, since to prove the premise true the theist must show that <em>all <\/em>subjective accounts are doomed to failure.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Of course, there is more that can be said and if needed I\u2019ll write a follow-up. I&#8217;d appreciate any comments and\/or objections.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>William Lane Craig\u2019s version of the Moral Argument goes something like this: &nbsp; If objective moral values exist then God&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18,20,10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-18","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-atheism","category-philosophy-2","category-religion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/18"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=18"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/notung\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=18"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}