{"id":950,"date":"2007-11-22T15:18:00","date_gmt":"2007-11-22T15:18:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/2007\/11\/22\/sleight-of-hand-with-faith\/"},"modified":"2007-11-22T15:18:00","modified_gmt":"2007-11-22T15:18:00","slug":"sleight-of-hand-with-faith","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/2007\/11\/22\/sleight-of-hand-with-faith\/","title":{"rendered":"Sleight-of-hand with \u201cfaith\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>[warning &#8211; this is long: over 4k words]<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">Introduction<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Theists \u2013 particularly Christians \u2013 often appeal to \u201cfaith\u201d. Here are three fairly typical examples:<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 Theists regularly say \u201cBut belief in the existence of God is ultimately a matter of faith, not reason\u201d, when confronted by someone demanding to know whether they can muster a cogent argument in support or defence of their belief.<br \/>\u2022 Theists sometimes also insist that theism and atheism are both \u201cfaith positions\u201d, and so equally rational\/irrational.<br \/>\u2022 And theists are fond of suggesting that, just as it\u2019s a positive thing to place your faith in those around you (otherwise life would be impossible), so it must also be positive to place your faith in God.<\/p>\n<p>In this paper, I question whether these appeals to faith are as legitimate as they might first appear.<br \/><span style=\"font-weight: bold\"><br \/>Reasonable belief<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s begin by looking at reasonable belief. Often, when you believe something with reason, you possess good grounds for supposing your belief is true.<\/p>\n<p>Take, for example, my belief that there is a tree outside my office. I can\u2019t now see the tree, but I am certainly justified in supposing it\u2019s there. I saw it only a minute ago. It\u2019s always been there whenever I have entered my office. And there\u2019s no reason at all to suppose that someone has somehow managed silently to remove it while I have been sitting here. So I\u2019m justified in believing the tree is still there.<\/p>\n<p>Surely, I\u2019m also justified in believing that Japan exists, despite the fact that I have never been there myself. I have seen innumerable TV programs about Japan, I have met people who claim to be from Japan and who all speak with that characteristic accent. And I have seen countless maps on which Japan clearly appears. Some of my relatives even claim to have been there. So, again, I have excellent reason to suppose Japan exists.<\/p>\n<p>I\u2019m also justified in believing that the battle of Hastings took place in 1066. I have read about the battle in a number of books written by reputable authors, so I have pretty good reason to suppose it\u2019s true. Maybe this belief of mine isn\u2019t quite as well confirmed as my belief that Japan exists. After all, historians can and do make big mistakes. But it is, nevertheless, a pretty reasonable thing for me to believe.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, while I\u2019m justified in holding these beliefs \u2013 while I have good reason to hold them \u2013 it\u2019s possible I\u2019m mistaken. Most if not all our beliefs about the world are open to at least some doubt. Even my belief that Japan exists. It\u2019s just possible that there has been some huge and elaborate conspiracy to dupe me into thinking Japan exists when in fact it doesn\u2019t. Perhaps my whole life has been controlled by forces intent on deceiving me about what\u2019s really going on, as in the film The Truman Show (in which Truman, the character played by Jim Carey, discovers that his entire life has been contrived as part of a TV soap opera). The point is that, though it could turn out to be true that Japan doesn\u2019t exist, it\u2019s very unlikely that it doesn\u2019t exist. The reasonable thing for me to believe is that it does. For I have powerful evidence that it does, and hardly any evidence to suggest that it doesn\u2019t.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">Reasonableness comes in degrees<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Note that reasonableness comes in degrees. Beliefs can be more, or less, reasonable. My belief that Japan exists is very reasonable indeed. So too are my beliefs that the Earth revolves around the sun, that Elvis Presley is dead, and that there are no fairies at the bottom of my garden. Other beliefs lie in the middle range: there is some reason to suppose they are true, but perhaps not enough to warrant belief. For example, there is some reason to believe that there is life on other planets: we know there are millions of other solar systems many of which would be capable of producing and sustaining life. It\u2019s not wholly unreasonable to suppose that life has evolved elsewhere. But perhaps there isn\u2019t sufficient evidence to justify belief in extra-terrestrial life.<\/p>\n<p>Towards the bottom of the scale there lie beliefs for which there is very little supporting evidence and indeed considerable evidence against. The beliefs the Elvis is alive and well, that fairies exist, and that the world is run by a secret cabal of Martian imposters all fall into this category (despite what you might read on some internet sites). So there is a scale of reasonableness: beliefs can be more or less reasonable, given the evidence. To qualify as a reasonable belief, a belief must at least fall within the top half of the scale.<\/p>\n<p>Now where on this scale does belief in God lie, do you suppose? Does it feature down at the \u201cFairies exist\u201d end of the spectrum? Does it lie somewhere in the middle, along with belief in extra-terrestrials? Or is towards the top of the scale, perhaps as high as my belief that the Battle of Hastings took place in 1066, or even as high as my belief that Japan exists? Take a moment to think about it: where would you place belief in God?<\/p>\n<p>My guess is that most people who believe in God consider their belief to be pretty reasonable, that\u2019s to say, at least as reasonable as belief in extra-terrestrial life, and perhaps even as reasonable as my belief that the battle of Hastings took place in 1066.  Certainly, that\u2019s what most of the Christians that I have asked have said. Not one has ever suggested that belief in God is no more reasonable than is, say, belief in fairies. They\u2019re always confident that belief in God is fairly high up there on the scale of reasonableness.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">Arguments for the existence of God<\/span><\/p>\n<p>But are they right? Is belief in God reasonable?<\/p>\n<p>There are all sorts of reasons why you might suppose it is. Here are a few:<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 Millions of people believe in God. They can\u2019t all be wrong, can they?<br \/>\u2022 Many claim to have experienced God directly, though a revelatory experience. Surely at least some of these experiences must be reliable?<br \/>\u2022 There are many religious miracles, miracles that could not have happened if God did not exist.<br \/>\u2022 Jesus tells us that God exists, and we know Jesus to be a reliable source of information. Therefore it\u2019s likely that God exists.<br \/>\u2022 The universe shows signs of having been designed. So God must exist as its designer.<br \/>\u2022 Where did the universe come from? Why did the Big Bang occur? Things don\u2019t just happen, do they? There\u2019s always a cause, an explanation. But then the Big Bang must have a cause and explanation. And by far the best explanation is that the universe was created by God.<\/p>\n<p>These are some of the most popular arguments for God\u2019s existence. Of course, the majority Christians are happy to accept that these arguments don\u2019t conclusively prove that God exists. There is, they will admit, room for doubt about whether there\u2019s a God. Nevertheless, you might think that these arguments provide us with pretty good grounds for believing in God, grounds sufficient to make belief in God reasonable.<\/p>\n<p>But do they? Personally, I don\u2019t think they do. Any good introduction to the philosophy of religion will explain why most if not all of these arguments are, at least as they stand, fatally flawed. By saying that the arguments are fatally flawed, I mean not that, while the arguments do provide good grounds for believing in God, these grounds fall short of being conclusive. Rather, I mean that these arguments actually provide us with very little, if any, reason to suppose that God exists.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">The problem of evil<\/span><\/p>\n<p>That there\u2019s little reason to suppose God exists is bad enough. But the situation for theism is, rationally speaking, actually far worse then that. There is also a powerful argument against the existence of God, the argument raised by the problem of evil. It runs as follows.<\/p>\n<p>God, according to Christians, Jews and Muslims, is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good. These are defining attributes of God. If God exists, He must possess all three. A being with only two would not qualify as \u201cGod\u201d, as Christians, Jews and Muslims understand the term.<\/p>\n<p>Now, there is a great deal of pain and suffering in the world, much of it natural in origin. Yes, God, if He exists, made \u201call things bright and beautiful\u201d. But let\u2019s not forget that He also made cancer, earthquakes, famine, the Black Death and haemorrhoids. By such means God inflicts great pain and misery on His children. And not just on we humans. Anyone who has watched a few of David Attenborough&#8217;s TV programmes about natural history will no that, for very many of the sentient creatures with which we share this planet, life is horrifically &#8211; indeed, almost unimaginably &#8211; cruel. And this sort of extreme cruelty has been unleashed on a daily basis over many hundreds of millions of years &#8211; long before we humans  made our recent appearance on the planet.<\/p>\n<p>It seems that, if the universe does have a creator (and let\u2019s just suppose, for the sake of argument, that it does \u2013 though even this is highly doubtful) then either He doesn\u2019t know about this appalling suffering, in which case he\u2019s not all-knowing, or He is unable to prevent it, in which case He\u2019s not all-powerful, or else He doesn\u2019t much care about the agony he inflicts on sentient beings, in which case He is not supremely benevolent. Either way, the creator is not the Christian\/Jewish\/Muslim God, who, by definition, has all three attributes.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">Direct religious experience of God<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Some theists maintain, perhaps correctly, that a belief can be reasonable even if not supported by argument or evidence.<\/p>\n<p>Take my belief that there\u2019s an orange on the table in front of me. I don\u2019t <span style=\"font-style: italic\">infer<\/span> that there orange is there on the <span>basis<\/span> of <span style=\"font-style: italic\">evidence<\/span>. I can just directly <span style=\"font-style: italic\">see<\/span> it there. That makes my belief reasonable, <span style=\"font-style: italic\">despite the fact that it is not supported by argument or evidence<\/span>.<\/p>\n<p>Might I not, in the same way, have direct experience of God? If I am lucky enough to have such an experience, might it not then similarly be reasonable for me to believe, despite the fact that I cannot muster a cogent argument or evidence in support of my belief?<\/p>\n<p>This sort of move faces on obvious objection, however. We know that many people have such apparently revelatory religious experiences. However, these experiences differ dramatically in terms of what they seem to reveal &#8211; indeed, they <span style=\"font-style: italic\">contradict<\/span> each other.<\/p>\n<p>Thus many of these experiences must be at least partly deceptive. We also have powerful evidence \u2013 in the form of the problem of evil \u2013 that there is no all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God.<\/p>\n<p>How, then, can it be reasonable for someone in possession of both (i) this information about the unreliability of such experiences and (ii) powerful evidence (provided by the problem of evil) that what they seem to experience doesn&#8217;t actually exist, to suppose that their own experience is reliable guide to reality?<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">Attempts to solve the problem of evil<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Those who believe in God have tried to deal with the problem of evil in various ways. Some suggest that our suffering is caused partly or wholly by our own free actions. Some argue it is fair and just punishment for our own wrong-doing. Some suppose the suffering and hardship we endure have a purpose \u2013 to make us better people. Without suffering, we cannot become the virtuous people God wants us to be.<\/p>\n<p>You might wonder why God didn\u2019t just make us virtuous to begin with. But in any case, if suffering is the unavoidable price we must pay for virtue, it is hard to explain why God dishes out suffering in the way He does. Why do mass-murdering dictators live out their lives in luxury? Why do sweet and lovely people have horrendous diseases inflicted upon them? It is, to say the least, difficult to understand how the seemingly random distribution of suffering in the world could really turn out to be \u201call for the best\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Some try to defend the suggestion that the suffering is for our own good by insisting that \u201cGod works in mysterious ways\u201d. In some not-fully-understood-by-us way, God\u2019s giving babies cancer really does make the world a better place.<\/p>\n<p>But this is really just to concede defeat. It\u2019s to point out that, despite the fact that the distribution of suffering certainly doesn\u2019t seem to make any sense, nevertheless it may ultimately make sense. Well, yes, it may ultimately make sense (and there maybe fairies at the bottom of the garden). But that\u2019s not to deny that the evidence really does, on the face of it, point very firmly towards there being no God. (For more on the problem of evil, see &#8220;<a href=\"http:\/\/stephenlaw.blogspot.com\/2007\/02\/god-of-eth.html\">The God of Eth<\/a>&#8220;.)<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">Where the onus lies<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Of course, I might be wrong about all this. Perhaps you disagree with me. Maybe you think the problem of evil can be dealt. Perhaps you think that there are good arguments for the existence of God after all.<\/p>\n<p>What I want to stress here is that if, at the beginning of this paper, you placed belief in God pretty high on the scale of reasonableness, then the onus is now on you both to provide some decent arguments in support of this claim to reasonableness, and to explain how the problem of evil can be dealt with. Otherwise, I think you should admit that you made a mistake: belief in God does not lie as high on the scale of reasonableness as you thought. Belief in God is actually pretty low on the scale. It\u2019s down there near belief in fairies.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">An extreme form of \u201cfaith\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Now many believers would say, at this point, that I am focusing far too much on reason. \u201cIt really doesn\u2019t matter that I can\u2019t provide good reasons for believing in God,\u201d they say. \u201cNor does it matter that you can provide me with seemingly powerful evidence that there is no God. Belief in God is a matter of faith, not reason. One must just believe. \u201d<\/p>\n<p>This sort of appeal to faith might seem to offer the theist some respite from the rational probing of an atheist like myself. They can just turn their back on the evidence and the arguments and say, \u201cWell, I believe anyway, despite the evidence. I have faith.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>But notice that, in order to offer any genuine respite, the faith they appeal to at this point has got to be of a very extreme sort: they must believe, while at the same time acknowledging that they have no more reason to believe than they have to believe that, say, Elvis lives or that there are fairies at the bottom of the garden.<\/p>\n<p>Now that is a very difficult thing to do. Could you do it? Could you really make yourself believe something, while also accepting that you had no more reason to believe it than you have to believe in, say, fairies?<\/p>\n<p>Frankly, I doubt you could. I couldn\u2019t. Certainly, this sort of extreme faith is very difficult if not impossible for anyone to sustain by a sheer act of will.<br \/><span style=\"font-weight: bold\"><br \/>A more common sort of \u201cfaith\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p>In fact, while those who believe in God talk of having \u201cfaith\u201d, they rarely mean the extreme sort discussed above. As I pointed out right at the beginning of this paper, most theists think their belief in God is pretty reasonable.<\/p>\n<p>So what, then, do they mean when they say that belief in the existence of God is a matter of \u201cfaith\u201d?<\/p>\n<p>Usually, it turns out they mean only that, while there may be pretty good grounds for believing in God, these grounds fall short of constituting proof. God\u2019s existence is \u201cnot proved\u201d. What does the theist mean by \u201cnot proved\u201d? They mean that the evidence of God\u2019s existence isn\u2019t irrefutable. They could be wrong. It\u2019s possible that God doesn\u2019t exist (just as it\u2019s possible that the battle of Hastings wasn\u2019t in 1066).<\/p>\n<p>This way of using the term \u201cfaith\u201d is obviously to be contrasted with the extreme form of \u201cfaith\u201d discussed a moment ago. That sort of \u201cfaith\u201d is the faith that is downright unreasonable \u2013 as unreasonable as, say, belief in fairies. This sort of \u201cfaith\u201d, on the other hand, requires only that the belief not be proved. And of course, a belief may be very reasonable indeed without being proved. In fact, on this way of using the term \u201cfaith\u201d, all our scientific theories come out as \u201cfaith\u201d positions. Even the theory that the Earth revolves around the sun!<br \/><span style=\"font-weight: bold\"><br \/>Sliding between these two senses of \u201cfaith\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Theists often slide between these two senses of \u201cfaith\u201d without realizing they have done so.<\/p>\n<p>For example, when given a hard time by an atheist about the reasonableness of their belief, theists often retreat to \u201cfaith\u201d in order to defend themselves. \u201cBelief in God\u201d they will say, \u201cis a matter of faith, not reason\u201d. They hope that will make the atheist shut up and go away.<\/p>\n<p>But we have seen that, here, only the extreme sort of faith will do. If an atheist appears to have shown that belief in God is downright unreasonable, it won\u2019t do for the theist to reply \u201cBut belief in God is a matter of faith\u201d if by \u201cfaith\u201d they simply mean \u201cnot proven\u201d. For the atheist\u2019s point is precisely that not only is belief in God not proven, it\u2019s also downright unreasonable: as unreasonable as, say, belief in fairies.<\/p>\n<p>But then it would be underhand of theists to appeal to the extreme sort of faith (a form of \u201cfaith\u201d they would probably find it impossible to sustain) to fend off rational attack by an atheist, and yet, when the atheist has left the room, to revert back to claiming that while they have \u201cfaith\u201d in God\u2019s existence, nevertheless, belief in God is \u201cpretty reasonable, just not proved \u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Yet this is what many theists do. By surreptitiously switching between the two senses of \u201cfaith\u201d they engage in a philosophical sleight-of-hand. They craftily use \u201cfaith\u201d to dodge the need to deal with evidence and arguments which, on the face of it, show belief in God to be downright irrational, while at the same time continuing to maintain that belief in God is quite reasonable.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, not all theists resort to such linguistic trickery. Many try to deal honestly with the arguments and evidence. Others confess they cannot: they bite the bullet and simply believe while admitting they have no more reason to believe than they have to believe in fairies. My point is that all theists should do one or other of these two things. Unfortunately, many do neither. They choose instead to pull a fast one with \u201cfaith\u201d.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">A bad argument<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Here\u2019s another, different, trick that theists sometimes pull by switching between these two senses of \u201cfaith\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cLook,\u201d the theist may say. \u201cI admit I can\u2019t prove God exists. But then the atheist can\u2019t prove He doesn\u2019t. So atheism and theism both require a leap of faith. But if theism and atheism are both faith positions, than they are equally irrational, aren\u2019t they? They are intellectually on par.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This argument trades on the same ambiguity in the term \u201cfaith\u201d. The claim that atheism and theism are equally a matter of \u201cfaith\u201d in the sense that neither is conclusively and irrefutably proved is here being used to obscure the fact that the evidence and arguments may overwhelmingly support one position over the other. The two positions may well not be intellectually on par.<\/p>\n<p>After all, I can\u2019t prove that fairies exist. But neither can I conclusively prove that they don\u2019t. It doesn\u2019t follow that it would be just as sensible for me to believe that fairies exist as it is for me to believe that they don\u2019t.<\/p>\n<p>Similarly, while both theism and atheism may qualify as \u201cfaith\u201d positions in the \u201cnot proved\u201d sense, it may be that the belief that there is no God is just as rational as the belief that there are no fairies, i.e. very rational indeed. In short, it doesn\u2019t follow that if atheism and theism are \u201cfaith\u201d positions in the \u201cnot proven\u201d sense then they are \u201cfaith\u201d positions in the extreme sense.<\/p>\n<p>The argument may be bad, but, as I say, it\u2019s popular. Here\u2019s an example I recently came across on the internet:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cGod\u2019s existence cannot be proved by physical means. However, neither can it be disproved. What does this mean? It means it takes complete and utter faith to believe there is a god (or gods) and complete and utter faith to believe there is not one.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This argument appears to involve the same slide between the two uses of \u201cfaith\u201d. It moves from \u201cNeither theism or atheism can be proved or disproved\u201d to \u201cTherefore, both are a matter of \u201ccomplete and utter faith\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Now I admit that the fact that neither atheism nor theism can be proved really does entail that both are \u201cfaith\u201d positions in the weak \u201cnot proven\u201d sense of faith (though notice that this doesn\u2019t entail that the two positions are intellectually on par). But the author concludes that it must therefore take complete and utter faith to believe that God exists\/doesn\u2019t exist. This strongly suggests that she thinks both are \u201cfaith\u201d positions in the extreme sense. And if both faith positions in the extreme sense, then it really does follow that atheism and theism are equally irrational.<\/p>\n<p>You can see that the author trades on the ambiguity concerning what \u201cfaith\u201d means. By sliding from one of the two uses of \u201cfaith\u201d to the other, the author creates the false impression that atheism and theism are intellectually on par. A nice rhetorical trick.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">The arguments behind \u201cfaith\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Suppose I claim to have \u201cfaith\u201d in God\u2019s existence. We have seen that, if I mean by this only that I accept that God\u2019s existence can\u2019t be proved, I may still take my belief to be quite reasonable. More reasonable, in fact, than the atheistic alternative.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, as I have indicated, theists who claim to have a simple and trusting \u201cfaith\u201d rarely consider their belief to be no more sensible than is, say, the belief that Elvis is still alive and well, living out his life in secret. The second belief is clearly irrational and absurd, the theist will no doubt point out, for there\u2019s little in the way of supporting evidence and pretty good evidence to the contrary.<\/p>\n<p>But is belief in God any less irrational and absurd? I can\u2019t see that it is.<\/p>\n<p>Yet few theists are willing to accept that belief in God is this irrational. Even those who claim simply to have \u201cfaith\u201d \u2013 who insist they \u201cjust believe\u201d \u2013 will often, if pressed to explain why they believe, quietly whisper, \u201cBut the universe must have come from somewhere, mustn\u2019t it?\u201d<\/p>\n<p>It turns out, in other words, that behind claims to \u201cfaith\u201d often lurk the standard theistic arguments (in this case, argument (vi) above). These arguments, while perhaps not explicitly laid out in the mind of the believer, nevertheless make their presence felt. Arguments (v) and (vi) in particular are extremely seductive. It takes most of us considerable intellectual effort to understand why they are (at least as they are usually formulated) fallacious. It\u2019s unsurprising, then, that even those who claim to have \u201cfaith\u201d often take their belief to be reasonable.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, the belief that Elvis lives is rather frivolous and inconsequential. Belief in God is not: it can have huge, life-changing effects. There\u2019s no doubt that the question \u201cDoes God exist?\u201d is one of immense seriousness and importance. It has dominated human thinking for thousands of years. Belief in God seems to answer a yearning that most of us have. It\u2019s not to be dismissed lightly.<\/p>\n<p>Still, the question remains whether there is any more reason to believe in God than there is to believe that Elvis lives. Are those who believe in God any better justified? The answer, perhaps, is that they are not. We shouldn\u2019t allow talk about \u201cfaith\u201d to obscure this fact, if it is a fact.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">Having faith in other people<\/span><\/p>\n<p>To finish, I want to turn to yet another way in which the expression \u201cfaith in God\u201d tends to get used.<\/p>\n<p>We often speak of \u201cplacing our faith\u201d in someone. When I saw David Beckham walk up to take that penalty in the World Cup match against Argentina, my friend Mike said, \u201cHe\u2019s going to miss!\u201d But I said, \u201cHave a little faith in Beckham. He\u2019ll do it.\u201d And Beckham scored. So I was right to place my faith in him.<\/p>\n<p>We constantly place our faith and trust in those around us. I have faith in the postman: that he will deliver my letters and not chuck them in the bin. I have faith in my bank manager: that she will deal with me honestly and won\u2019t disappear with all my money. Indeed, without this sort of trust in others life would become impossible, wouldn\u2019t it?<\/p>\n<p>So it seems that placing our faith in others is generally a positive, even an admirable, thing to do . But then, whether or not it\u2019s reasonable to believe in God, isn\u2019t it, by the same token, positive and admirable thing to place our faith in God?<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: bold\">The Santa case<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The above argument involves a serious muddle. In fact, we can distinguish two further senses of \u201chaving faith in so-and-so\u201d. On the one hand, we have believing that a person will act in a trustworthy and\/or reliable manner. On the other hand, we have believing that a person exists.<\/p>\n<p>Notice that these are two very different sorts of \u201cfaith\u201d. The first sort of \u201cfaith\u201d simply takes for granted that the individual in question actually exists. The \u201cfaith\u201d merely concerns the character of that person. Having made that distinction, let\u2019s now consider the following case.<\/p>\n<p>Dad is short of money and Christmas is coming. His two children are eagerly awaiting their presents, but he cannot afford to buy them any. Still, he is not disheartened. In fact, he\u2019s feeling quite upbeat. Dad knows there is little reason to suppose that Santa Claus exists, but nevertheless places his faith in Santa Claus to produce presents for the children on Xmas day.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cDon\u2019t you worry, children,\u201d says Dad. \u201cI know that Santa is a good person. I feel quite sure that he will bring you lots of presents.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Is this father\u2019s \u201cfaith\u201d in Santa, a \u201cfaith\u201d he also encourages in his children, really a positive and admirable thing?<\/p>\n<p>I think not. The problem is that, unless Dad has pretty good grounds for supposing Santa exists, his faith in Santa is faith of a downright silly, and, in this case, potentially upsetting and damaging sort.<\/p>\n<p>In short, to place your faith in the goodness of a person is only positive and admirable if you have pretty good reason to suppose the person in question actually exists.<\/p>\n<p>So what I want to know is: what reason is there to suppose that God exists? If there isn\u2019t any, then I think theists should acknowledge that placing your faith in God\u2019s goodness is not a positive and admirable thing to do. In fact it\u2019s a downright silly, perhaps even damaging, thing to do.<br \/><span style=\"font-weight: bold\"><br \/>Conclusion<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Theists use the word \u201cfaith\u201d in several different ways, often without acknowledging or even realizing that they are doing so.   In fact, by surreptitiously switching between uses, theists use the term \u201cfaith\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 as a tool by which they can, quite unfairly, avoid justifying their belief and sidestep awkward atheistic arguments (\u201cBut belief in God is a matter of faith, not reason!\u201d),<br \/>\u2022 to disguise the fact that atheism is far , far more reasonable than theism (\u201cBut they\u2019re both faith positions!\u201d), and<br \/>\u2022 to borrow, quite illegitimately, some of the positive sheen that attaches to having \u201cfaith in others\u201d in order to gild their own more dubious \u201cfaith in God\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>I confess that, as an atheist, I find this sort of sleight-of-hand with \u201cfaith\u201d highly irritating. I wish the theists would stop it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>[warning &#8211; this is long: over 4k words] Introduction Theists \u2013 particularly Christians \u2013 often appeal to \u201cfaith\u201d. Here are three fairly typical examples: \u2022 Theists regularly say \u201cBut belief in the existence of God is ultimately a matter of faith, not reason\u201d, when confronted by someone demanding to know whether they can muster a [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[111],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-950","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-sleight-of-hand-with-faith"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/950","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=950"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/950\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=950"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=950"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/skepticink.com\/believingbullshit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=950"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}